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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the respective energy policies of the European Union (EU) and
Turkey, identifying common goals and external threats in order to entertain the hypothesis of
whether Turkey is the ideal energy partner for the EU. The analysis supports the formation of a
full energy partnership between the EU and Turkey, arguing that common goals will achieve
greater fulfillment while common external threats will remain more effectively palliated through
partnership. The policy level adjustments both for the EU and Turkey are recommended and
justified in detail throughout.
Overall, both the EU and Turkey prioritize diversifying their energy suppliers, combating
climate change, and ensuring stable and competitive energy markets for their consumers. In the
EU, energy demand is projected to rise by 11 %, while import dependence by 20 % by 2030 (to
71 %). Turkey remains 73% resource dependent overall, with a 97% dependence on natural gas
specifically. Both rely on Russia to supply most of their natural gas, creating the mutual goal to
diversify their suppliers and reduce the impact of one-sided dependence. The Nabucco Pipeline
project has become the poster child of ‘pipeline politics’, or supply diversification affairs
between the EU, Turkey, and resource supplier regions such as the Caspian, the Caucasus, and
the Middle East. Nabucco also serves as the linchpin of the EU-Turkish energy partnership at
present; this thesis will argue that further institutional measures are necessary, both within the
EU and in Turkey, in order to equip this long-term project for success.
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Specifically, the EU needs to enable its members with a choice of suppliers through
constructing pipeline interconnectors. This will further the notion of diversifying suppliers and
reducing the dominance of Russian natural gas, as well as foster the formation of an integrated
natural gas market. Turkey, on the other hand, should be allowed to open the Energy Chapter of
accession negotiations and implement the energy related acquis communautaire. This will
benefit business and investment relations in the energy sector, as well as promote more cohesive
handling and maintenance of projects such as Nabucco between the EU and Turkey.
With regard to combating climate change, both the EU and Turkey have made ambitious
formal commitments. The EU employs the 202020 Strategy, aiming to reduce carbon emissions,
improve energy efficiency, and incorporate renewable energy into the mix by 20 percent by
202020. Turkey enacted a National Climate Change Strategy in 2010 which aims to incorporate
renewable energy by 30 percent by 2023, while also curbing emissions, improving efficiency and
introducing clean coal technology. Within the EU, diverging performance among member states,
due to different socio-political and economic factors, threatens the acquisition of 202020 targets.
A means of bridging these gaps is to introduce EU-funded subsidies for countries whose
renewable energy sectors have failed to thrive, and whose governments have not already
introduced subsidies for renewable technology. This would involve making adjustments in the
EU budget; currently, conceptualization of the EU’s 2014-2020 allocates 20 percent to fulfilling
the goals of the 202020 Strategy. However, this thesis also argues that investment into the
Turkish renewable energy sector would not only reinforce the EU’s status as a global leader
against climate change, but also benefit the EU’s goals.
Turkey has undergone great energy market liberalization efforts within the last decade, as
well as interconnected its electricity network with the European network, ENTSO-E. As such,
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renewably produced electricity in Turkey could be transferred to bordering easterly EU
countries, which happen to exist as the countries struggling to meet their renewable energy
targets and embrace this market. Turkey itself possesses the world’s fifth largest geothermal
capacity, eighth largest hydroelectric and significant wind and solar (situated in the Sun Belt).
From an economic standpoint, creating an economy of scale for renewable energy will improve
profit margins over time, as well as instill investor confidence both within the EU and Turkey.
EU level internal subsidies will also serve as a means to this same end. As such, Turkey can
serve as a catalyst to creating competitive and integrated natural gas and renewable energy
markets within the region, better enabling the fulfillment of energy policy goals of the EU and
Turkey.
Finally, an energy based partnership with Turkey will improve the EU’s ability to
influence, or exercise normative power, within the region. Through partnership with Turkey for
projects such as the Nabucco pipeline, the EU has already been able to bridge gaps in its
relations with countries in the Caspian region, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Partnering
with Turkey in a more comprehensive respect will also offer the EU an opportunity to reinforce
its position as a normative leader against climate change. Turkey itself exercises a generally
successful “Zero Problems with Neighbors” foreign policy approach, and hopes to become an
energy hub in the region for trade. The EU already finances in part Turkey’s development
through Pre-Accession funds to prepare Turkey to become ‘fit’ enough to join the EU, however
investment directly pooled into the energy sector will allow Turkey to progress more quickly to
become a more carbon-neutral economy as it grows. This remains in alignment with the EU’s
foreign policy as well as its approach to combat climate change in part through assisting the
environmentally responsible development of third countries.
vFinally, this thesis will argue that the EU must exercise a modified external governance
policy towards Turkey in order to avert undesirable consequences. Turkey has shown interest to
join the EU since its inception; however accession negotiations did not begin until 2005. At
present, little progress has been made due to formally blocked chapters by select EU member
states. Meanwhile, opening certain chapters, such as the Energy chapter, has become
increasingly necessary, especially considering large-scale, long-term projects already underway.
The coordination necessary to generate success for projects of this kind cannot be achieved with
the current lack of political, institutional and regulatory harmonization in an energy context.
Furthermore, the EU must tread carefully with regard to the stalled accession
negotiations, as frozen negotiations could lead to a uniquely ‘frozen conflict’. With greatly
vested interests, especially with regard to energy affairs, failed relations could undermine the
EU’s efforts to diversify its energy suppliers and improve its relations with its external
neighborhood. In particular, rejecting Turkey as a candidate country or continually preventing
accession negotiations to move forward would tarnish the conditionality and credibility attached
to EU candidate status, weakening the EU’s normative power, while also reinforcing negative
stigmas of the EU turning the cold shoulder to Muslim populations. In particular, this would
harm relations with the Caspian, Caucasus and Middle East; the very regions where the EU
wishes to improve relations and create a symbiotic interdependence of energy supply through
diversification.
Supported by the aforementioned ideas, this thesis concludes that a full energy
partnership between the EU and Turkey is in the best interest of both entities for energy and
foreign policy related endeavors.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Energy Challenges in Real Time
One of the most important issues facing the twenty first century is energy. Where it
comes from, how much there is, the cost, how efficiently we use it (or don’t) and last but not
least, its impact on the environment and people. Energy policy should serve and protect the
consumer and the environment; which involves short term and long term trade-offs. For
example, exploiting oil sources in the short term may benefit business, industry, and the
consumer, but harm the environment long term. Or, investing in renewable energies and forcing
industries to implement low-carbon technology may create upfront costs and disadvantage
business, yet helps the environment both short and long-term, while paying back industry later.
As such, the public and private sectors must collaborate to formulate effective policies that
balance these tradeoffs.
This paper explores the energy policies of the European Union (EU) and Turkey, in order
to determine whether an energy partnership between them is attractive, feasible, and above all
beneficial for the environment and the people. First, energy policy areas favoring Turkey and
the EU as ideal energy partners, as well as those which prevent both from enjoying a
collaborative and productive energy partnership will be identified. In reality, the EU and
2Turkey’s shared goals and priorities outweigh the components of their respective energy policies
which diverge. Furthermore, much divergence is due to different levels of development.
Next, the objective of forging an energy rapprochement between the EU and Turkey will
be identified by virtue of the goals of mutual interest that the EU and Turkey exhibit through
their energy policies. Indeed, both favor diversifying energy suppliers, combating climate
change, and ensuring a stable and competitive energy market for their consumers. This opens the
door for a productive partnership between the two polities.
Following, the policy mechanisms by which an energy rapprochement can be
accomplished will be elaborated. This includes policies and projects for implementing energy
supply diversification, combating climate change, and improving bilateral and multilateral
engagement in the region of greater Europe.1 This section will identify policies and projects that
are ongoing and under conceptualization, divided into subject areas of supply diversification,
combating climate change through procedural changes and investment, ensuring competitive and
stable markets for consumers through creating integrated natural gas and electricity markets
(particularly for renewably produced electricity), as well as adjusting foreign policy strategies to
better respond to existing issues and realities. This section will also deliberate and recommend
policies that should be adopted in order to obtain these objectives. Finally, justification of
recommended objectives and policy revisions will be elaborated.
Indeed, with energy needs continually rising, the imminent threat of climate change,
market fragilities and a mutual desire to diversify natural gas supply routes, the EU and Turkey
have more at stake—and more to fight for and against. The debate remains: will they fight
1 Greater Europe refers to the EU, Eastern Europe and its bordering countries, the Balkans, the Caspian, Central
Asia, and North Africa.
3together or separately? Can Turkey’s energy policy complement the EU’s? Are advantages or
disadvantages inherently added if both entities join forces to achieve common objectives
together? Is such cooperation politically viable?
Indeed, the answer to all of these questions is affirmative.  Turkey and the EU have and
will continue to partner together, Turkey’s energy policy already does complement the EU’s with
regard to its ideals—yet implementation remains to occur. The EU can have a large impact in
this regard. Certainly many advantages result in a stronger, more environmentally responsible
Turkey partnering in business and diplomatic endeavors with the EU. Such cooperation is viable,
and increasingly necessary. Turkey, undergoing massive reforms to liberalize its energy market,
diversifying supply routes, maintaining healthy relationships with neighboring countries, and last
but not least, possessing enormous renewable energy potential, could become the EU’s most
prized energy partner under the right conditions.
Specifically, partnering with Turkey could help the EU reach its goals of diversifying
suppliers and incorporating renewable energy. However, political cooperation both among EU
member states and between the EU and Turkey are essential for such a partnership to blossom.
The market plays a crucial role, as does business; however business partners within the EU and
Turkey have already solidified strong ventures and relationships across sectors. On a small,
private scale, business relationships flourish. The linchpin for success lies in political
cooperation at the EU-Turkish level, for an energy partnership of this caliber, with long term
commitments and consequences, requires a deepened harmonization of knowledge and more
comprehensive agreements. This requires a more unified vision of energy policy at the EU level,
and implies a continued display of willingness and cooperation from Turkey. Although this
research does not function based on the assumption that Turkey will join the EU within the near
4future, mainly due to political and historical disputes which remain beyond the scope of this
research, it does suggest that a failed partnership between the EU and Turkey will prove
detrimental to the fulfillment of both entities energy related goals. Furthermore, this research
posits that a continual stagnation of EU-Turkish accession negotiations, and especially the
Energy Chapter of the EU acquis communautaire, will greatly undermine initiatives that are
already underway to improve relations and meet combat common external threats. Furthermore,
a failed relationship between the EU and Turkey within the context of its status as a candidate
country could tarnish the EU’s foreign relations with countries in the Middle East, the Caspian
Region and the Caucasus; as it will destabilize the conditionality and credibility attached to
obtaining EU candidate status and implementing EU regulations for the purpose of eventual
membership. In essence, the projects underway between Turkey and the EU, as well as their
interconnectedness in many contexts are so far reaching at present, that failed progress in
accession negotiations could unravel the fruitfulness of any potential partnership, decreasing
stability and increasing resentment. This, of course, would not favor business, trade, energy
policy objectives, or foreign relations.
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METHODOLOGY
A qualitative methodology was employed for the research purposes of this thesis. Six
formal interviews were conducted in person by the author with personalities from both the
private and public sector representing the European Union, France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Turkey and the United States. This individuals are the following: Serap Atan, Representative of
TUSIAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) of the Paris Representative Office,
Francois Bernard, Director of Invest in Turkey for France Belgium & Luxembourg, Başak
Yalçin, Representative of the Turkish Embassy in Paris, Fatih Yildiz, the Turkish Consul
General of Chicago, Charles Hantouche, Executive Manager and Director of the EU-Turkey
Twinning Project of RTE (Réseau et Transport d’éléctricité) and Riva Kastoryano, Research
Director of the Center of International Studies and Research at Sciences-Po Paris, France.
Members of TUSIAD represent the service and industry sectors, pooling membership from
across 3,500 companies, generating about half of the value-added in Turkey, and realizing 80
percent of Turkey’s foreign trade. As such TUSIAD has an important voice in Turkey’s
government and political climate, helping set the agenda with their business influence as well as
publishing research and case studies to stimulate awareness and generate change in Turkey.
Invest in Turkey was extremely helpful to understand the business transactions in both the
private and public sector ongoing between Turkey and the EU, with particular regard to foreign
direct investment into the energy sector, as well as Turkey’s foreign relations with its
neighborhood aside from the EU.  The Turkish Embassy in Paris was especially helpful in
6offering insight into the French-Turkish situation, highlighting efforts undertaken to foster
cooperation and partnership, as well as offer ideas regarding the problems associated with a
Turkey-EU partnership failing. The Turkish Consulate in Chicago offered incredible insight from
a Turkish perspective in an American setting, directly addressing Turkey’s energy issues, goals,
and foreign policy strategy. RTE is the public owned French subsidiary of EDF, Electricity of
France. It possesses independence finance, management and accounts and is the operator of
Europe’s biggest power grid, acting as the pushing force behind the formation of an integrated
European electricity market.  RTE offered detailed and complex explanations of the European
electricity network, the Turkish electricity market and other energy markets, as well as the pilot
projects run between the EU, France and Turkey to interconnect electricity and assist Turkey in
implementing EU level regulations and business practices in the energy sector. Finally, the
Center for International Studies and Research at Sciences-Po Paris was particularly helpful in
offering additional resources regarding EU-Turkish interactions and EU law.
Three of the six interviews were recorded and transcribed, and two of these were then
translated from French to English.  For the other three, notes were taken during the interview and
summarized by the author immediately following the interview for purposes of accuracy.
Furthermore, in depth field research was employed, analyzing governmental policies,
laws, and publications as well as relevant literature in the field. Sources include but are not
limited to Eur-lex, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, the Economist Intelligence
Unit, and the Turkish Ministry of Natural Resources & Energy.  The Atlantic Council’s Black
Sea Energy & Economic Forum proved particularly helpful in offering perspectives from key
political figures from countries around the Middle East, Caspian, Caucusus, Turkey and the
7European Union with regard to energy politics. Transcripts were examined and used for further
analysis by the author.
Limitations of this research and qualitative methodology include the small sample size,
which does not allow for analysis to be made which would represent the EU or Turkey as a
whole. Nonetheless, each interviewed person offered insight from their field of expertise directly
related to the research question, while publications and laws studied and referenced remained
accurate and up-to-date.
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ENERGY POLICY REVIEW
Turkey and the EU share much in common with regard to their respective energy
policies, despite being at different levels of maturity. Publications by Turkey’s Ministry of
Natural Resources and Energy and the European Commission show that both prioritize
diversifying energy suppliers and routes, combating climate change, and improving their
markets. Both acknowledge the need to create an energy market that evaluates long-term benefits
as well as short-term, in particular with regard to renewable energy, and recognize the necessity
and value in implementing sustainable technologies and methods, even if it requires a higher cost
upfront. Furthermore, both evaluate gaining regional power and facilitating partnerships as
important components of achieving their goals. Certainly, several intrinsic and contextual factors
differ (such as where to exert regional influence, diversify suppliers, and to what extent natural
resources can be utilized, as these are nation-specific). Both face rising energy demands as well.
In sum, the two don’t seem so ill-suited for one another as energy partners. But do they practice
what they preach when it comes to their relationship? Based on their aforementioned goals, a
long-term energy based rapprochement between Turkey and the EU appears in order.
Of course, this would assume greater political cooperation and a certain level of
regulatory harmonization, for the purpose of facilitating business and trade; maintaining the
same standards, employing the same methods of technology and remaining active in the same
projects requires shared competence. For example, projects like Nabucco will be more navigable
9and electricity transmission or repairs within an interconnected network simplified. Access to
foreign relations with regard to energy would also be shared; if conjoint, Turkey and the EU
display greater power. For instance, the EU cannot as easily facilitate deals in the Caspian or the
Middle East without Turkey supporting it for political reasons, whereas cutting a deal with
Turkey and the EU together becomes more attractive, as it includes access to the EU’s enormous
and wealthy consumer base.
Meanwhile, increased partnership with the EU will help bring Turkey’s energy sector up
to speed, this not only benefits the EU in that they gain a more economically fit partner with
shared competence in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and more, but also implies that
Turkey would begin to espouse the same vigor to combat climate change. As combating climate
change truly does not adhere to national borders, progress of European neighbors in this arena
should be, in theory, equally as celebrated. As a world leader in tackling climate change, the EU
would gain credibility and credence by having a hand in helping Turkey reach climate change
resistance goals it had conceived, but been unable to obtain. The following chapter will explore
the pertinent aspects of EU and Turkish energy policy, outlining areas where they align and also
diverge, as well as issues present in both policies, in order to begin an evaluation of how the EU
and Turkey can transform their current relationship into a productive and reliable energy
partnership.
Current Energy Dynamics in the EU and Turkey
One of the most forefront energy issues of the twenty first century revolves around
supply. Both the EU and Turkey are net energy importers. For both, their main energy source is
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Russian natural gas. According to the European Commission’s Green Paper in 2000, energy
demand is expected to rise 11 percent (compared to 1998) in the EU while energy import
dependence will rise upwards of 20 percent by 2030. With EU energy production peaking in
2010, this means that energy import dependence will increase from 50 percent in 1998 to 71
percent in 2030, in tandem with a rise in oil and gas import prices. Subsequent studies have
confirmed this prediction. Effective policies must be fashioned to distribute the EU’s import
dependence in order to counteract reliance on one source. This requires both internal and
external political cooperation. Additionally, greater strides must be made by the EU to add
incentive to alternative sources of energy, such as renewable, since the market alone has not
supported these methods to date.
The Commission’s report elaborates a rather grim depiction of the situation: “Nuclear
energy and solid fuels have been decried, oil is subject to geopolitical hazards which are hard to
control, renewables are failing to penetrate the market because they present technological
difficulties and are not profitable enough. Natural gas supplies could in the long run be subject to
risks of instability” (European Commission 2000, p 78). The latter encompasses the risks
identified by the EU, initiating a new wave of EU energy policy. The objectives include carbon
emission reduction, energy efficiency improvement, incorporation of renewable energy and
diversification of energy suppliers and routes. This policy places a large emphasis on the phasing
out of fossil fuels and controlling of emissions and the phasing in of renewable energies and
clean technologies. The market has not favored the entry of renewable technologies due to high
capital investment upfront coupled with technological barriers; to avert market failure, the EU
must intervene with incentives and financial support mechanisms. Certain member states already
exercise this, and have seen successful results; however the EU must take part in fostering the
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implementation of renewable energy in nation states that cannot handle this burden alone. With
regard to natural gas supply security, potential solutions extend beyond the breadth of the EU
itself, encompassing the surrounding region, an aspect which the EU continually addresses with
multilateral regional initiatives. Turkey has been no stranger to this EU strategy and their needs,
which will be elaborated subsequently in this paper.
Combating climate change has become the cornerstone of EU energy policy, making the
EU a global leader. This is reflected in the EU’s energy policy strategies with regard to carbon
emission reduction, improving energy efficiency, and introducing renewable energy as a
significant contribution to the energy portfolio. Turkey possesses some of the largest renewable
energy potential’s in the world; they simply have not been cultivated yet, due to political and
infrastructural challenges and an inchoate pooling of financial support. Yet, by obtaining EU
candidate status in 1999, massive legislative reform and the implementation of the EU acquis
communautaire began. At the opening of the accession negotiations in 2005, Turkey began
enjoying handsome sums of European investment, which in turn has helped promote the
transformation, or Europeanization, of the Turkish energy sector. Nonetheless, there are large
gaps to be filled.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s population and demand grows at impressive rates; energy demand
rises at least 2.5 percent per year and the country’s energy sector is undergoing a liberalization
make-over in tandem with its democratization efforts. Turkey’s neighbors hold 70 percent of the
world’s natural gas and oil reserves; a vital strategic asset for the EU in terms of energy supply
route diversification. Turkey houses significant renewable energy potential, but lacks the finance
and infrastructure to invest in these technologies single-handedly. Russia dominates the natural
gas market, upon which both the EU and Turkey are reliant, and demonstrates fluctuations
12
between cooperation (often bilateral), ambivalence, and strategic self-interest with regard to its
external relations and energy market maneuvers. With Russia growing stronger, there is an
increasing need for the EU and Turkey to work together to address energy issues together in
order to ease their dependence on Russia.  These elements have transformed the geopolitical
conversations between the EU-Turkey and its surrounding region in recent years.
Two factors stand out when evaluating the EU and Turkey’s energy partnership: ‘pipeline
politics’ and the fight against climate change. With regard to pipeline politics, or the security of
natural gas supply, in theory, the situation remains quite simple. Turkey is the bridge between the
EU and non-Russian natural gas suppliers, and Turkey enjoys overall positive relations with
these neighbors, especially due to a recent “Zero Problems with Neighbors” foreign policy
approach. Working together, the EU and Turkey can forge agreements to build new pipelines
from new suppliers, diversifying and improving the security of their energy supply. However, in
practice, this objective has known many trials and tribulations, stemming from the EU, Turkey
and its neighborhood.  This situation will be analyzed at length, to posit the means necessary for
Turkey and the EU to achieve these ends.
THE EUROPEAN UNION: ENERGY POLICY
EU energy policy is a shared competence among the EU and its member states. EU level
directives and even well-oiled systems set and achieve Community level goals, but member
states maintain the right to implement goals with their own methods and pace. There is no
question that in recent years the European Union has exercised large efforts and implemented
complex mechanisms and legislation to forge an EU Energy Policy. The goals of the EU’s
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energy policy can be synthesized into three main themes; improving energy supply and security,
combating climate change, and providing growth and jobs. Each theme involves overall goals.
Improving energy security includes diversifying energy import suppliers and routes, and
providing diplomatic and financial assistance to countries in the European neighborhood.
Combating climate change involves the latter as well as external goals, while internally
prioritizing energy efficiency improvement (reducing consumption), reducing carbon emissions,
and incorporating renewable energy into production.
The EU Energy Policy includes significant trade-offs. Diversifying import suppliers,
while cautious and strategic for ensuring long-term security of supply through spreading need
across sources, may imply forging relationships with countries that the EU is not familiar with.
This can include making new diplomatic compromises and a potentially high learning curve.
Economically, it may be costly to invest in the European Neighborhood, and these investments
risk failing to implement change if political leadership is absent or maintaining alternative
visions. Internally, introducing renewable energies, reducing carbon-emissions and improving
efficiency threaten the business-as-usual balance sheet. The aforementioned changes involve
high upfront costs with high long-term benefits. However, countries and businesses require
incentives and financial buffers to ease the transition to an efficient, low-carbon and renewable
energy friendly market. In order to achieve the EU’s third-tier goal, providing growth and jobs,
low-carbon and renewable energy markets demand financial support; otherwise the market will
continue to favor less costly approaches. The European Emissions Trading System, explained in
detail to follow, has provided a first attempt to make a low-carbon industry transition as painless
as possible.
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The EU’s energy initiatives remain works in progress; despite studies and legislation
pioneered by the Commission, a harmonized EU Energy Policy is in skeletal formation, at best,
and external governance in the area shifts in tandem with the region’s political volatility. Indeed,
within the EU, nation states maintain considerable sovereignty with regard to energy issues.
Even binding Community law on energy allows nation states to set and implement their own
targets. Currently, monitoring and reporting is not effectively harmonized (ergo, nations self-
monitor), allowing for large divergences in what member states contribute and hindering rapid
progress towards the EU’s goals.
Nonetheless, most EU members as a whole favor the main themes of energy policy;
combating climate change and improving energy security, as both are viewed as common
external threats that will create negative consequences for the EU as a whole. This has allowed
for progress towards comprehensive EU energy policy.  In a legal communication to the
Parliament, the Commission outlines these common external threats: “The point of departure for
a European energy policy is threefold: combating climate change, limiting the EU’s external
vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons, and promoting growth and jobs, thereby providing
secure and affordable energy to consumers” (European Commission 2007).
What’s written between the lines is that the EU combines self-interests with altruism to
formulate its approach to energy policy. Certainly, it must mitigate energy security risks and
protect its market and consumers, especially in light of its increasing energy consumption.
However, the EU genuinely prioritizes combating climate change, and considers itself to be a
leader and norm-setter in this regard.  In turn, this affects the EU’s external governance tactics
with regard to energy. On one hand, the EU seeks to stabilize its neighborhood in order to enjoy
long-term stable energy contracts with its supplier countries, therefore increasing its energy
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security future. These motivations remain self-interested. The EU’s External Action and Energy
Policy exemplifies this, aiming to meet growing demand, stabilize prices and eliminate shortages
through “common and coherent EU energy policy” and partnerships with its neighbors
(European Union External Action Service 2012).
On the other hand, the EU genuinely believes that integrating the countries in its
neighborhood (the Caucasus, Caspian Region, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and North Africa)
will enhance the region’s stability and commitment to international endeavors such as climate
change.  In this regard, the EU does not see itself as a single actor, but truly favors regional and
global participation to curb climate change. This explains its constant efforts to engage countries
in its surrounding region in what it deems right and just. At the Copenhagen Conference of
2009, the EU supported a legally binding global treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol in 2013,
and pledged to boost its carbon emission reduction to 30 percent by 2020 if other large
industrialized nations commit to lowering their emissions (however this has not occurred). The
EU also pledged €7.2 billion in financial aid from 2010-12 to support the implementation of
green technology, products and services in developing countries (European Commission Climate
Action: Energy for a Changing World 2012). The aforementioned demonstrates the EU’s
collective perspective and leadership towards combating climate change.
Meanwhile, the EU’s last Kyoto Protocol commitment pledges a Community level 8
percent reduction in CO2 levels (compared to 1990 levels) by 2012 (European Commission
Green Paper 2000, p 53). Considering one third of Europe’s electricity is generated by coal, over
one third of electricity (and 15 percent of total energy) comes from nuclear sources, and only 6
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percent remain generated via renewable resources (Tekin & Williams 2009, p 3), this target
remains very ambitious.
Fear of falling short helped foster the development of the 202020 Strategy. The strategy
involves reducing carbon emissions, improving energy efficiency, and boosting the share of
renewable energy into the mix by 20 percent by 2020. If implemented properly by all member
states, the EU would indeed reserve status as a global environmental superhero. Ensuring the
fulfillment of these goals is paramount for the EU to maintain its status as a powerful world
leader. Historically a peace-keeping and economy integrating project, the EU can apply the core
of its purpose to the environment—restoring peace and prosperity on the earth by combating
climate change and acting as an energy-conscious community. No other entity to date prioritizes
and rallies in favor of environmental consciousness quite like the EU—if the EU fails to meet the
goals engrained in the values it supports, the world watching will shake their heads and continue
business as usual. Yet, if the EU succeeds, countries around the world will begin to understand
that combating climate change can occur in tandem with prosperity. The EU itself must continue
perfecting its strategy to ensure completion of its goals, which involves an increased pooling of
sovereignty on energy issues and additional legislation setting and monitoring by part of the EU
to ensure that each member state participates as actively and effectively as it can.
Internal Measures
To implement the EU’s energy goals, several internal measures must be addressed.
Carbon emission reduction, energy efficiency, and introducing renewable energy while
protecting the market and promoting growth and jobs. These measures challenge business as
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usual behavior, rising costs and encouraging the adoption of new technology. In order to avoid
market failure, which would undermine the EU’s energy goals as a whole, the EU needs to lessen
the burden on businesses transitioning to green technologies. Consumer preferences are also
important, if strong enough so that the consumer will pay more for a product that is
environmentally responsible.
If this presence is not marked enough, the market will not absorb these measures
naturally unless governments and the EU provide incentives and mechanisms. One successful
mechanism is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS), which trades emissions
to reduce the cost of emitting less CO2 across companies while still reducing them overall.
Another measure involves efficiency, or using energy more effectively. The public can have a
particularly large emphasis in this area, by altering their energy use habits and making
environmentally responsible transportation decisions (biking, walking, public transportation,
etc). Finally, renewable energy is due to contribute 20 percent to the energy mix by 2020. The
EU has passed a series of legislation to implement this goal, however is lacking incentives.
Adding incentives such as subsidies will make renewable energy’s entry into the market more
smooth and profitable.
Carbon Emission Reduction
The main instrument adopted to reduce EU carbon emissions is the EUETS, the largest
carbon-trading system in the world. The system has been largely successful overall, and sets the
EU on the right track to meet its goal of reducing carbon emissions by 20 percent by 2020.
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All EU members participate, as do Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, totaling thirty
countries. It functions as a “cap and trade” system, wherein the amount of emitted greenhouse
gases is limited (the cap) for different companies, factories and plants. Each of these possesses
emissions allowances which they can buy and sell to each other, or keep for future needs. The
system’s goal is to make carbon emission reduction as painless as possible through flexible trade,
allowing emissions cuts to be made where it is least costly to businesses. Each year, member
states submit a detailed report to the Commission, which in turn creates a target catered to the
particular conditions of each member state. The member state then has the discretion to
implement and monitor the measures to meet this target. Emission allowances are traded within
the overall EU emission limit. Companies and countries that do not comply are punished with
fines.
Currently, the ETS applies to 40 percent of the EU’s total greenhouse emissions. Certain
sectors, such as transport, agriculture, and waste are not included in the system, but have
different mechanisms aiming to control them. In 2012, the airline sector will be added to the EU
ETS, along with petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminum industries will join in 2013 (European
Commission Emissions Trading System 2010).
To account for sectors that are not included in the EU ETS, the Commission passed the
Effort Sharing Decision, creating annual binding greenhouse gas emissions targets for all EU
members from 2013-2020. However, these targets, like those of the ETS, are defined according
to relative wealth and implemented at the discretion of each member themselves. If all functions
according to plan, this would achieve a 10 percent reduction in corresponding emissions at the
EU level by 2020.
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The EU is also exploring technology for carbon sequestration, in order to “mitigate the
effects of coal and gas production and also other CO2-intensive industries such as cement, iron,
steel and petrochemicals” (Commission Climate Action Energy for a Changing World 2011).
On the whole the system has known great success, trading over 3 billion tons in 2008,
corresponding for 64 percent of the global carbon market (Laurent 2009)2.
Nonetheless, in order to effectively allow the EU to meet its 202020 goal, the EUETS
must envelop more than 40 percent of the energy market. Specifically, the inclusion of transport,
agriculture and waste are particularly necessary to include. Otherwise, the effort remains
incomplete and does not achieve its potential. Especially considering the overall success of the
EUETS to date, other sectors should be phased in with minimal negative cost related tradeoffs.
Energy Efficiency
To reduce consumption and improve energy efficiency, the EU has successfully passed a
series of binding directives and regulations which require green products, buildings and services
to increase efficiency. The EU defines energy efficiency as a ration between an output of
performance, service, goods or energy, and an input of energy (Energy Community 2012). This
includes the following: the Eco-Design Directive, the Energy Star Regulation, the Labeling
Directive and its implementing Directives, the Directive on Energy End-Use Efficiency and
Energy Services and the Energy Performance  of Buildings Directive. With these measures, the
Commission aims to integrate energy-efficient goods and services into the internal market. Since
the internal market and trade have historically stood as areas in which the EU enjoys full
2 Original Text : 3, 09 milliards de tonnes échangées en 2008, le marché européen du carbone représente à lui seul
64% du marché mondial du carbone
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jurisdiction, passing this legislation was a relatively low-resistance procedure. The end result is a
‘greener’ internal market, bolstering energy efficiency (European Commission Action Plan for
Energy Efficiency 2006, p 9). Finally, The Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services
Directive require all member states to adopt national indicative energy savings action plans,
outlining their reduction targets. Targets must reduce consumption through energy efficiency
measures by 9 percent within nine years (2016).
Improving EU energy efficiency is paramount to its goals. The endeavor entails dealing
with its own; the EU 27, arguably an easier feat than coordinating external energy policy with
the diverse and turmoil prone composition of its neighbors. Furthermore, improving energy
efficiency is simply cost-effective, as per the Commission, which in 2006 calculated the cost of
inefficient energy usage as 100 billion Euros through 2020, and views energy efficiency as “by
far the most effective way concurrently to improve security of energy supply, reduce carbon
emissions, and foster competitiveness” (European Commission Action Plan for Energy
Efficiency 2006, p 3). However, extending the hand of the government to industry and the
market is only half the battle. Citizens must also engage in environmentally responsible behavior
through by consuming less in their homes, as well as altering their lifestyles towards low-carbon
alternatives for transportation, such as biking, walking, and utilizing public transportation.
According to Eurobarometer’s June 2011 poll, 68 percent of Europeans consider climate change
to be a ‘very serious issue’, which they consider the second greatest problem in the world (after
hunger, poverty and lack of drinking water—presented as a single issue). 88 percent expect the
EU to use more renewable energy, and combating climate change is considered the responsibility
of governments, the EU and business; only 20 percent reported to feel a personal responsibility
(Eurobarometer 2011).
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As such, although the average European opinion on climate change is in check, they must
realize the significance of their individual actions and contributions, which almost ironically,
encompasses a collective outlook.
The EU also identified improving the efficiency of the transportation sector and
introduction of fuel efficient cars as an essential component of consumption reduction.
According to the Commission, if the EU can manage to improve efficiency (aka reduce
consumption) by 20 percent by 2020, CO2 emissions would be reduced by more than twice the
EU reductions pledged under the Kyoto Protocol by 2012 (European Commission Action Plan
for Energy Efficiency 2006, p 4). Another requirement for the transportation sector, a major
contributor to carbon emissions, is outlined in the Renewables Directive, elaborated below.
Renewable Energy
EU Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger refers to renewables as the “no-regret
option” for achieving EU energy policy goals (Oettinger 2012). The EU Renewables Directive
requires member states to enact National Action Plans, “taking account of each country’s starting
position, improvements already made and differing levels of prosperity”, complete with binding
targets indicated by the Commission. In short, all countries must increase renewable energy
production and use for electricity, heating, air conditioning and transport. Furthermore,
renewable fuel (such as biofuel) must equal 10 percent of transport fuel in each country by 2020.
The Commission anticipated that markets and investors would respond more favorably to
renewable energy and continuous development of new technology if national targets were
mandatory (European Commission 2009/28/EC, paragraph 14). Of course, setting a mandatory
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long term national target can become problematic in the event of unexpected economic shocks or
long-term crises, both symmetric and asymmetric across the EU. However, on the whole, the EU
took a pragmatic approach with regard to anticipating the market’s reaction.
Nonetheless, in certain countries, additional subsidies and incentives are needed. While
some states have made considerable progress, others have lagged drastically in comparison.
Once again, the mosaic of socio-political and economic factors across EU countries makes
coordination of energy policy a significant challenge (European Commission Climate Action:
Renewable Energy 2012).
The reasons behind this problem of divergence are complex, and vary among member
states. A number of components such as economic wealth, the direction of national priorities,
available resources, dictate whether a country can handle and implement renewable energy
technology without market failure, as well as whether it offers subsidies and incentives for green
technology. Economically powerful and politically stable countries like Sweden and Denmark
meet and surpass the EU’s objectives with ease.
The starlet, Sweden, has pledged renewable energy to be at least 50% of the total energy
usage by 2020. The Swedish government has consistently maintained long-term goals to create a
carbon neutral environment Sweden also pledges a 20 percent increase in the efficiency of
energy usage by 2020. Sweden deploys economic instruments, such as a carbon dioxide tax,
international emissions trading and certificates for renewable electricity. Not to mention the
government spent 1 billion per year for energy research by the Swedish Energy Agency. For
technologies that are not yet commercially viable, as was the case for solar and biogas in 2009,
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Sweden subsidizes its generation, distribution and use (National Renewable Energy Action Plan,
Sweden 2011).
Similarly, Denmark has pursued an active energy policy since the 1970s, with energy
saving and renewable energy as high priorities; by 2020, Denmark will be among the three most
energy efficient countries in the OECD, and commits to 30 percent of renewable energy by 2020
through national measures. These measures include “subsidies, political agreements on the
establishment of wind farms, tax exemption, a biomass agreement and support for information
campaigns and research” (National Renewable Energy Action Plan, Denmark 2011). When
calculating targets, Denmark only includes already approved measures.
This creates a stark difference from a country like Bulgaria, whose proposed initiatives
will meet barriers when introduced. Furthermore, Bulgaria’s proposal had over a dozen major
wholes, whereupon the Commission issued formal remarks and demanded revisions.  These
issues varied from incorrect or misleading calculations, to unclear tables and graphs for imports
and exports of sources such as biomass, and weakly referenced adaptation strategies to surmount
and simplify legal procedures and harmonize policy across levels within Bulgaria. Bulgaria
recognizes that “the insufficient experience of energy suppliers and consumers in the field of
renewable energy technologies and the relatively higher prices result in weaker demand […]
New technologies are still slowly making their way in certain sectors” (National Renewable
Energy Action Plan, Bulgaria 2011).
A country like that Bulgaria, that underwent enormous political and social changes post-
1989 and have recently implemented (or are implementing) the aquis communautaire, are not
operating on the same playing field as Sweden and Denmark. Certainly, this creates greater
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challenges for Bulgaria to improve efficiency and implement renewable energy. Nonetheless,
their target share of renewable energy by 2020 is 16 percent an improvement from their target of
9.27 percent in 2005.
Meanwhile, Portugal, although not the most economically powerful in the EU, still
manages to excel in comparison. Portugal’s climate is renewable energy friendly, allowing for it
to become a feasible priority in government. More than 40 percent of Portugal’s electricity
production comes from renewable sources and renewable contribute 20 percent of the final
energy consumption share. In some cases, such as Italy, a laggard market approach and
economic issues prevent renewable energy from sticking. Italy’s proposed renewable energy
share for 2020 is 17 percent, a hair above Bulgaria’s.
In sum, action must be taken at the EU level for countries that cannot afford, literally, to
implement renewable energy and efficiency measures. With the EU offering subsidies, or
pooling money into a fund meant for national governments to offer tax cuts to firms that
implement green technologies, the less capable economies such as Bulgaria and Italy would have
no excuse for staying behind.
The Commission also wishes to exercise a larger amount of control, justifying the need to
avoid a ‘spill-over effect’. In the words of the Energy Commissioner:
“If investors in the renewables sector are faced with stranded costs in one country
because of retroactive changes in the support framework, they might not be willing to
invest in the sector altogether. The destabilizing role of politics is the reason why we look
very strictly at whether Member States fulfill their obligations under the Renewables
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Directive, and why I have also personally sent strong messages when this was not the
case”.
However, sending “strong messages” might not be enough to convince countries and
industries to invest in what many consider expensive and high-risk renewable energy.
One effort to combat high costs upfront includes the European Economic Recovery
Programme, which allocates funds towards carbon capture and storage (1 billion Euros) and
offshore wind demonstration (565 million Euros) to encourage implementation of renewable
energy and sustainable technologies (European Commission Climate Action 2010).
EU Public Expenditure
As previously mentioned, the EU needs to pick up the slack of certain member states that
cannot currently keep pace in the fight against climate change. Currently, the EU’s flagship
effort is the Life Programme, pioneered by the Commission. It contributes to the
“implementation, updating and development of EU environmental policy and legislation by co-
financing pilot or demonstration projects” (European Commission Life Programme 2012). It
allocates 2.2 billion Euros a year. However, this singular solution is not effectively meet the
needs of countries with weaker economies. Indeed, the Life Programme fantastically showcases
pilot projects, spreading awareness, and making a difference on a small scale throughout the EU,
however it does not offer the kind “state-aid” or in this case, “EU-aid” that is necessary in many
cases. EU public expenditure is integral to facilitate long-term transformation processes with
high upfront costs. The 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework’s 1.025 billion euro
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planned expenditure is strongly aligned with the 202020 Strategy, with record making
contributions of 20 percent of the EU budget, pooling from across all EU funds, to finance
combating climate change (Medarova-Bergstrom, IEEP 2012). Indeed, with EU putting money
where its mouth is, countries like Bulgaria can receive the assistance they need.
Overall, the backbone of environmental responsibility is solid in Europe, as seen through
the 202020 Strategy and its flagship initiatives. These measures remain nascent in nature, and are
continually being reformed to more effectively produce the desired results. The latest inclination
to finance the 202020 Strategy from the EU budget is an exciting and promising development in
the right direction. Nonetheless, the EU could still stand to exert greater control with regard to
energy policy, in order to create, monitor and enforce National Plans and quotas across countries.
With these ingredients, the EU will ensure its fulfillment of its goals, setting a world standard
with positive global outcomes.
External Measures
In addition to the measures that can be addressed internally, the EU’s energy goals also
involve external measures. These measures call upon the EU’s external governance strategy,
underlining the importance of cultivating healthy relationships with countries in the European
Neighborhood, as well as remaining active in enabling progress, peace and cooperation in the
area. Especially considering the European neighborhood comprises vast natural gas, oil and
renewable resources, the EU would be wise to engage these countries as partners rather than
competitors. This is especially true with regard to Turkey. Turkey not only provides the
geographic solution to diversifying Europe’s natural gas supply, but also maintains positive
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relations with countries in the Caucasus and Caspian that could supply natural gas and engage in
economic trade. As such, Turkey can facilitate agreements in partnership with the EU, whereas
the EU rallying alone might be far less successful in this particular region. As a result, all parties
involved benefit as goods are sold and needs are met. In short, the elements of supply
diversification and external governance demonstrate the components of energy policy whereupon
the conditions of foreign countries and the decisions they take remain vital to the fulfillment of
the EU’s energy goals.
Supply Diversification
The EU has great challenges with regard to its supply of natural gas. Considered a cleaner
source of fuel, the EU depends greatly on natural gas and is by far a net importer of it. Until
recently, the EU was satisfied with receiving most of its imports from Russia; however political
disputes engrained in differences in ideologies have caused the EU to fret over the unforeseeable
consequences of relying on Russia. This has given birth to initiatives such as the Nabucco
pipeline, which has in turn forced the EU to solidify relations with neighboring countries, with a
particular importance on Turkey.
The Community level basis for the security of supply involves Directive 2005/89/ EC and
Directive 2004/67/EC, which basically lists measures to safeguard electricity and gas supply, by
ensuring member states maintain an adequately equipped and functioning system, balanced
supply and demand, organized reporting to facilitate a stable supply and investment market. In
short, the directives protect the decision of the European Council in 2002 to interconnect all
European networks (Energy Community 2012). However, no specific requirements are
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mentioned in the directives, and aside from lowest-common denominators, member states
maintain full control over their supply.
Meanwhile, in recent years the EU has found itself adjusting its external governance
regarding energy policies for the purposes of importing energy. In other words, since the EU is a
net energy importer, it must ensure its ties with surrounding nations are stable and productive,
especially with regard to those it imports from. Both internal and external factors play a part;
internally, energy demand is increasing and externally, supplier nations are both gaining power
and facing political turmoil. One particularly important politically charged power-play involves
the EU’s greatest exporter, Russia. Russia cut the cord on natural gas flowing into the EU via
Ukraine several times, from which the EU receives 80 percent of its natural gas. In essence, this
conflict harbored in Russia’s desire to play a role in the determination of Ukraine’s elected
leaders in order to ensure that candidates they supported received positions, as well as Ukraine’s
overall shift of focus towards the West, or Europe. Russia, feeling threatened that Ukraine would
turn its back on it, imposed a harsh ultimatum—insisting Ukraine pay the premium prices which
Europe pays for natural gas if indeed it wanted to shift its loyalties. When Ukraine refused to pay
higher prices, Russia cut Ukraine’s supply in December of 2005 and 2008. These actions shifted
the EU’s natural gas dependence into a significant vulnerability, as it highlighted the fact that
Russia was less than pleased with Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU, and was willing to play
hardball. Quite obviously, developing such a relationship with the EU’s top natural gas source
exacerbates energy insecurity, and undermines the ideal of maintaining fruitful and reliable
relationships with Russia.
Since, the EU began rethinking its dependence on Russia, wishing to diversify its
supplier portfolio and supply routes, thereby improving import security by allocating imports
29
across the region. In turn, energy acquisition security rose to the forefront of EU energy
priorities. To do so, the EU has engaged more frequently and adamantly with Turkey regarding
the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry natural gas from the Caspian region
through Turkey and into the EU. The agreement was signed in 2009, and logistical and political
debates regarding the supply of natural gas are in constant circulation across borders and among
political and business personalities. Logically, Turkey serves as an integral component of
Nabucco’s success, and is proving especially strategic with regard to negotiating with its
neighbors to guarantee non-Russian controlled natural gas sources for the pipeline.
With the EU’s energy acquisition needs and goals clear-cut, the EU’s political and
diplomatic prowess will be tested. This particular energy issue revolves very much around the
decisions of external players. As such, the EU’s external governance becomes particularly vital.
Regional External Governance: Energy Importer, Norm Exporter
Aside from establishing physical pipelines and exploring natural gas reserves in its
surrounding region, the EU, consistent with its integrative and norm setting reputation, exercises
soft power through bilateral and multilateral agreements to foster stability and cooperation
among its energy rich neighbors. Scholars Twitchett (1976), Maull (1990) and Manners (2002)
identify soft power as favoring diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems; along
with willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international
progress (Manners 2002, p 237).
Inherent to many of these, the EU offers funding in exchange for cooperation and
adoption of various measures. The EU created the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to
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elaborate its trade agreements and expand its regional foreign policy. The ENP orchestrates
cooperation between sixteen neighboring countries, which the EU identifies as “privileged
partnerships”. Turkey is not included in the ENP as it is a candidate country. This large scale
foreign policy goal eventually led to forming smaller and more region-focused divisions;
formation the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Europe
Partnership. This demonstrates excursion of soft power, as these methods aim to eliminate trans-
regional conflicts through multilateral diplomacy rather than military or economic intervention
(Müfltuler-Baç 2008).
Manners specifies that through exercising soft power while attempting to influence the
perspectives and opinions of other countries, the EU exercises normative power: “The concept of
normative power is an attempt to refocus analysis away from the empirical emphasis on the EU’s
institutions or policies, and towards including cognitive processes, with both substantive and
symbolic components” (Manners 2002, p 239).  In other words, the EU has the ability to
transform what “normal” means with regard to external governance and foreign policy among
countries. This denotes its normative power, as it can influence countries to adopt certain norms.
Normative power exemplifies social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and
good governance. These tools take root in the EU’s historical context and institutional design;
putting war aversion and economic prowess at the core of matters (Manners 2002).
Exercising normative or soft power is particularly important with regard to energy policy.
The EU cannot diversify its suppliers without exercising effective soft power among its
neighbors. Furthermore, regional countries rich with energy sources will be more likely to
cooperate with the EU if they desire to embody the same norms and values as the EU. Although
this is far from being the overwhelming sentiment in the entire region, countries like Turkey
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have wished to join the EU for over fifty years. Much of this desire harbors in the EU’s ability to
present itself as a model and norm setter. Even among countries that do not strive to join the EU,
if the EU engages these countries in multilateral initiatives, the region as a whole can stabilize,
making energy related trade more optimistic. None of these are possible without the EU exerting
normative power.
One example includes the Black Sea Synergy, which aims to improve economic and
political factors among its members. Countries concerned are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Although not blatantly
related to energy policy upon its inception, the Black Sea Synergy aims to stabilize the region in
order to make it a more suitable partner with economic, political and certainly energy related
affairs. Furthermore, the Black Sea Environmental Partnership was created in March 2010,
which encourages biodiversity conservation, integrated coastal zone and river basin
management, pollution reduction and “promoting environmental integration, monitoring,
research and eco-innovation” (European Union External Action Black Sea Synergy 2012). In
2007 alone € 837 Million worth of Community assistance (from the European Neighborhood and
Partnership Instrument and the Instrument of Pre-Accession funds) were committed to seven
non-EU Black Sea region countries. Turkey alone received € 497.2 million of this total. From
2000-2007 Turkey was allotted a total of € 1,537.2 million in assistance from the European
Union (European Commission 2008)3.
Nonetheless, at present, the accomplishments of these funds are vaguely presented, even
among EU publications. Overall, the partnerships remains largely symbolic, wrapped in soft
3 From 2000-2006 € 1,040 million was allocated under the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent
States (TACIS) programme, which offers technical assistance and supports economies in transition to adopt
democracy and rule of law into their political infrastructures. Today, TACIS has been replaced by the European
Neighborhood Partnership Instrument and the European Neighborhood Policy.
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agreements, with emphasis on improving research and education networks, organizing forums to
promote cooperation, building student networks, and so forth. Nonetheless, Turkey has
confirmed its intention to start formal negotiations to join the Energy Community Treaty, which
involves implementation of the acquis in the electricity and gas sector. Certainly, much of the
funds would contribute to this end.
The Union for the Mediterranean, or Euromed, has almost identical aims, only dealing
with sixteen Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern countries4. The Barcelona declaration
introduced Euromed and divides the EU and Mediterranean’s relationship into three categories:
security, economy, and civil society. It emphasizes the importance of engaging civil society via
NGOs, interest groups, environmental groups, and the like. Energy and environment specific
related projects include the improvement of railways and highways, the de-pollution of the
Mediterranean Sea and a large scale Mediterranean solar project. Finally, the Eastern
Partnership sings the same tune, hoping to encourage social, political and economic reforms in
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
These three initiatives echo the EU’s external governance style. The EU aims to export
its norms, namely democracy, rule of law, human rights, and sustainable development while
stabilizing its surrounding region through interaction and, in a perfect world, integration.
Certainly, stable and happy neighbors would benefit the EU in a plethora of ways, including the
realm of energy. However, all of the initiatives, while making strides towards a more collective
EU approach towards regional external governance, lack economic and political power. It still
remains obscure where funding comes from, who it goes to, and why. Furthermore, all
cooperation within and among these agreements are voluntary; an inconvenient barrier when
4 Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco,
Montenegro, Morocco, the PalestinianAuthority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
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trying to assimilate new procedures and raisons d’être. Binding engagements and financially
significant commitments from the EU and the countries concerned is necessary to enable
progress and adoption of EU approved economic, social and political reforms. It remains to be
seen whether these endeavors will bear fruit, such as Turkey joining the Energy Community and
implementing the acquis. This would prove as a milestone for the EU’s external governance and
multilateral integration efforts, as well as progress the EU and Turkey’s energy relationship.
Nonetheless, the EU does launch initiatives with an economic backbone. One such
example is the Trans-European Networks, (TEN-E) which identifies projects of European
interest and allocates funding to them. Projects of interest translate into projects involving gas
and electricity networks, while projects of ‘European interest’ involve projects which are cross-
border in nature.  The reasoning of the TEN-E assumes that funding will bring stability, and that
stability will behoove the EU’s security and diversification of supply: Interoperability with the
energy networks of third countries (accession and candidate countries and other countries in
Europe, in the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caspian Sea basins, and in the Middle East and
Gulf regions) is essential. It also maintains that the TEN-E will push sustainable development
forward by “improving the links between renewable energy production installations”, “using
more efficient technologies”. The TEN-E can distribute 20 million Euros per year to the projects
it deems most strategic and important (Europa: Trans-European Energy Networks).
Another fiscal tool involves the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund,
which uses public money to invest in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in
developing and transitioning economies.
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Both at a macro and micro level, the EU shows strong commitment to its values, and
actively pursues them through both internal and external measures. The EU could stand to invest
more money into its own nation states, by offering de facto incentives and subsidies when
needed. This could be accomplished without a further harmonization of EU energy policy,
requiring a budget shift towards climate change and perhaps for instance, away from the
Common Agricultural Policy. Already, the conceptualization of the next EU budget 2014-2020
envisions 20 percent of the budget dedicated to the EU’s energy initiatives, adding another
twenty into the 202020 Strategy! Over time, countries benefiting from Community level
assistance should eventually fulfill their potential within national contexts to utilize renewable
energy resources, maximize energy efficiency and reduce carbon emissions. Once nation states
reach a more even playing field, conceiving a more harmonized energy policy could become
conceivable, although the fate of the latter depends on many currently unpredictable economic
and political factors. With regard to external governance related to energy, the EU should
continue developed the initiatives it has in place to foster development within the surrounding
region, reinforce positive relations, and help instill an environmentally responsible mentality in
the region. Doing so will not only allow the EU to more easily diversify its energy suppliers, but
also will lessen the threat of shortages and cut-offs due to political unrest or disagreements.
TURKEY: ENERGY POLICY
Since the turn of the century Turkish energy policy has made significant transitions,
showcased by the ongoing transformation of the energy sector and the country as a whole.  This
has been heavily influenced by the current ruling party, the Justice and Development Party
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(AKP) under Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership, which has brought democracy and human rights
within reach by challenging the Turkish status-quo of state and military controlled management
(Bechev et al. 2011, p 10).  Since the AKP came into power in 2002, political volatility has
calmed, improving investor confidence. The AKP advocated EU accession during its campaign
and prioritized it since coming to power, advancing the constitutional and legal reforms
necessary to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria. The criteria summarize into possessing
stable institutions to ensure the rule of law, democracy, human rights and respect and protection
for minorities, a stable and functional market economy, and the capacity to implement political,
economic and monetary reform for the purpose of accession (Commission Accession Criteria
2011). As a result, Turkey gained EU candidate status in 2005. With political stability and
candidacy came credibility; henceforth unprecedented levels of foreign direct investment (FDI)
began flowing into Turkey. 80 percent of this FDI comes from Europe, and remains vital for
continual development of the energy sector and Turkey as a whole (Bernard 2011).
A desire for reform and to catch up to European standards stimulated a wide-spread
liberalization of the energy market, whereupon the market opened up to private competition in
phases and by sector. In tandem with liberalization came restructuring and reprioritizing,
whereupon Turkey signed the Kyoto agreement and made renewable energy, improving energy
efficiency, and meeting clean coal standards as pillars of their goals. Furthermore, Turkey also
recognized the prudence of diversifying source suppliers for natural gas, allowing it to invest just
as much energy as the EU in this affair. Finally, reforms and a renewed ambition to cultivate
positive relationships with all its neighbors allowed Turkey to envision itself as an energy hub of
the future. All the aforementioned aspects of Turkey’s new and improved energy policy work
towards the goal of becoming a regional energy hub.
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Internal Measures
Publications by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy identify energy supply
security, regional and global influence in the area of energy, and the environment and natural
resources as the country’s main energy policy goals. Turkey’s energy demands are on the rise,
and at a quickening pace. Turkey is still a developing nation, and characteristic of development,
its energy demand grows ever stronger by the year. As such, several internal measures, starting
with liberalizing the energy market, were needed in order to prepare Turkey the positive changes
in its economy and development. Turkey began transforming its energy policy as well, showing
its awareness of global issues, such as climate change. As such, Turkey now runs an ambitious
and feasible energy policy that is geared at maintaining a healthy and competitive market,
improving energy efficiency and incorporating environmentally responsible methods and
resources.
Energy Market Liberalization
The turn of the twenty-first century also brought privatization of energy sector through
litigation and legislative reform. A series of laws have helped privatize certain parts of the
energy sector, namely the electricity and natural gas markets, facilitating the transition towards a
competitive market. Prior to these reforms, the energy sector was controlled by state-owned
monopolies, which did not foster growth, innovation, or development. The first movements
towards liberalization started in the 1990’s. Until 1993, the state-owned Turkish Electricity
Authority (TEK) held a monopoly over the electricity industry, when it was separated into TEAS
for generation, transmission and wholesale power supply and TEDAS for distribution. Later, in
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2001, TEAS was separated into EUAS for generation, TETAS for wholesale and TEIAS for
transmission. Each exists as a separate legal entity pursuant to the 2001 Electricity Market Law.
The Electricity Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) was created in tandem with the Electricity
Market Law, in order to harmonize with the EU acquis communautaire and liberalize the energy
market (Deloitte 2010).These actions were by and large stimulated by prospects of EU
candidacy, and reinforced by receiving it. Additionally, Erdogan’s leadership had proven to be
forward thinking and in alignment with a competitive and globalizing world. These two factors
set the stage for drastic developments throughout the past decade.
Today, EMRA serves as the regulatory and supervisory authority over the entire energy
market, pioneering privatization, competition, stability and transparency.  It exists as an
administratively and financially autonomous institution with independent decision making. In
2003, the Natural Gas Market Law (no. 4646) and the Petroleum Market Law (no. 5015) were
passed to liberalize the sectors, giving EMRA regulatory and supervisory authority over these
markets as well. In 2005 the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Law (no. 5307) was passed for the
same purposes. Overall, these laws reduced government control and intervention in the energy
market, already making the Turkish energy sector today far different than it was a decade ago.
For example, before the Natural Gas Market Law, BOTAS, the state-owned gas supplier
and pipeline operator handled all imports and distribution. However, the law sets a 20 percent
share limit for any single market player, allowing the private sector to gain market share. EMRA
held natural gas city distribution tenders for 58 distribution regions, with 60 companies winning
gas distribution licenses. As such, natural gas is in part privately supplied to the industrial and
residential sectors of 63 of 81 provinces (The Republic of Turkey 2011, p 91). However, at its
onset, these decisions were logistically and administratively challenging to implement.
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According to the World Bank, top management in Turkey spends 27 percent of its time dealing
with ‘red tape’, related to frequent changes in rules and “a discretionary, unpredictable
implementation of rules, be it for taxes, for licenses, for procurement, or other transactions”
(World Bank 2011, p 3). With time, red tape should lessen and companies across sectors should
be able to adjust to the new regulations and legal system, yet for the time being, the ‘time-tax’
remains high.
Nonetheless, these developments have allowed for consumers to maintain more control
over who their suppliers are, and have also helped stabilize prices by introducing competition
among natural gas providers. In turn, more demographics have a better ability to obtain their
energy needs, and companies are empowered to choose suppliers based on quality and price.
Overall, the liberalization of BOTAS and the management undertaken by EMRA has helped
invoke a more open market pushing towards better standards and stable prices. Finally, as
outlined by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, plans are underway to increasing the
storage capacity for oil and gas in case of emergencies.
The Petroleum Market Law eliminated the government’s automatic oil pricing system,
allowing determination of prices based on the free market. Furthermore, it eliminated the quota
for distributors to procure at least 60 percent of their supply from national sources. EMRA can
issue licenses, approve certain tariffs and carry out investigations concerning market activities
(Deloitte 2010, p 15). The Electricity Market Law has forged significant private sector
investment as well with regard to generation, distribution, retail and wholesale of electricity,
although transmission share remains entirely public (Deloitte2010).
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The aforementioned provides an overview of the impressive reforms within the Turkish
energy sector during the past decade. Much of this has been a result of prospects of EU
membership, combined with unwavering solid leadership at the domestic level. As highlighted in
the previous section, Turkey has benefited from significant levels of financial assistance from the
EU within this time period as well. Certainly, the writing is on the wall with regard to the
changes that can be made when internal and external visions align and financial support is
provided. Nonetheless, despite the progressive liberalization of the energy market, Turkey still
faces many energy policy challenges. Turkey’s state-owned companies still maintain substantial
dominance; especially in electricity transmission and the natural gas sector.
Sustaining the Environment and Natural Resources
Another response to import dependence would be exploring renewable energy sources.
Turkey is currently taking steps in the right direction, taking part in the United Nations Climate
Change Framework Agreement in 2004 and 2007 and approving the Kyoto Protocol in 2009.
Turkey’s plan of attack to maintain its commitments involves improving energy efficiency,
adopting renewable energy resources and clean coal combustion technologies, and integrating
nuclear energy (The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2009, p 32).
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources specifies: “Our main target for the
renewable energy resources is to provide 30 percent share of these resources in the electricity
energy production”. Turkey hosts the world’s fifth largest reserves in geothermal and the eighth
largest in hydroelectric (Mahallesi 2011). Together, Turkey’s installed thermal, hydraulic,
geothermal and wind energy capacity for electricity generation in 2009 was 41, 745 MW with
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total production at 198, 570 GW/h.  Currently, hydroelectric power possesses the greatest share
of renewable electricity generation, with an additional 5,000 MW planned for installation by
2013.  Wind energy, which was nonexistent until 2002, increased significantly, reaching 800
MW installed capacity in 2009, with plans to increase capacity to 10,000 MW by 2015 (The
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2009, p 16). With regards to
geothermal energy, installed capacity reached 77.2 MW in 2009, and aims to increase this to 300
MW by 2015. It is in Turkey’s best interest to continue developing the renewable energy sector,
not only to meet the increasing demands of its own people, but to halt, if not reduce, the carbon
emissions of a fast-emerging economy. European investment will prove particularly beneficial
for this endeavor in Turkey, whose private sector is just finding its bearing and generating
increasing influence. The World Bank’s investments are extremely important as well; Turkey’s
Ninth Development Plan was conceptualized in collaboration with the World Bank, which
contributed $7.6 billion to Turkey within the context of the Plan’s ‘Country Partnership Strategy’
and another $3 billion from 2009-2010 to avert fallout from the globally spreading economic
crisis. As of June 2011, $5.422 billion has been invested into sixteen projects, five of which are
deal directly with energy, comprising 25 percent of total investment. Turkey is also the first
country to benefit from the World Bank’s Climate Technology Fund (World Bank 2011, p 6-8).
Without foreign investment in Turkey, the energy sector would not move as quickly or with as
much promise. Turkey still requires prodding to develop renewable energy; for example, the
World Bank set up a renewable energy loan in 2004, lending $500 million to the government run
Development Bank of Turkey and the private Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, as well as
gave $100 million from the Climate Technology Fund. This money has financed the construction
of 29 renewable energy projects (hydro, wind projects, and geothermal). These financed projects
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are expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 1.9 billion tons per year (World Bank 2011,
p 24). It becomes clear that external assistance to support development of a renewable energy
market is crucial within Turkey. Even so, Turkey must show strong levels of stability and reform
initiative in order to guarantee that investor confidence is high enough to support this sector’s
development.
On the domestic side, in order to promote renewable energy, Turkey amended the
Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical Energy Law
(originally enacted in 2005) in January 2011. Article 1 of the 2005 law states its purpose:
“to expand the utilization of renewable energy resources for generating electrical energy,
to benefit from these resources in secure, economic and qualified manner, to increase the
diversification of energy resources, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to assess waste
products, to protect the environment and to develop the related manufacturing sector for
realizing these objectives” (The Republic of Turkey 2005).
The amendment goes further to improve the incentives mechanism to encourage
investment into renewable energy sources and technologies by providing tariff incentives to
investors who sell their renewably produced electricity to the public for hydro, wind, geothermal,
and solar.
Furthermore, support will be provided to plants utilizing domestically manufactured
technical equipment (The Republic of Turkey 2011, p 91). However, considering the capital
needed to install renewable energy facilities, this carrot may not be enough to forge a
competitive and well functioning renewable energy market in Turkey. Continued and increased
investment from the EU would be paramount to developing this sector. Certainly, investment
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from other countries would prove beneficial for both parties; however the EU can take away
special advantages due to its close proximity. There are great long-term advantages to investing
in knowledge sharing and training, resulting in a common standard for equipment, maintenance
and practices. As Charles Hantouche of France’s Réseau de transport d’électricité (Electricity
Transmission Network) says:
“Among other European countries, if there’s a storm we can send technicians from one
country to the next, which requires the same technology and work methods.  If we
succeed at introducing our methods [in Turkey], that could allow to one day send
technicians and foster cooperation. We don’t have a [strategic] interest in training the
Chinese, for example. We have great relations, but they’re too far. At three hours by
plane, a Turk is in Europe” (Hantouche 2011).5
As such, in the event of a shortage, or minor or major problem, shared competence will
facilitate both business developments and damage control in the case of incidents. For this
reason, European FDI into Turkey is important for both entities.
Nonetheless, TEAIS, Turkey’s electricity transmission giant, maintains important
renewable energy objectives according to Charles Hantouche, “TEAIS’s objective involves the
famous number twenty, to make 20,000 mW of renewable energy by 2020” (Hantouche, 2011).6
5Original quotation : Long terme, avec les autre pays européen, s’il y a une tempête, on peut envoyer des techniciens
d’un pays à un autre. Faut avoir la même technologie et façon de travailler. Si on arrive à introduire notre façon de
travail, ça peut aider un jour d’envoyer des techniciens et faire de la coopération. On ne voit pas d’intérêt de former
de chinois, par exemple, on a des très bons relations, mais ils sont trop loin. Un turque à trois heures d’avion, ils sont
chez nous.
6 Original Quotation: « L’objectif de TEAIS, faire le fameuse chiffre 20 - 2020 faire 20 000 mW d’énergie
renouvelables ».
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In addition, by-laws regarding Competition for the Applications of the Wind Power Plant
Projects were enacted in 2010. The by-laws defined selection criterion as the contribution margin
for each kWh of electricity to be generated per wind power plant. The Turkish Electricity
Transmission Company (TEİAŞ), executed significant studies in 2011 and allocated thirteen
different tenders, which distribute a total of 5,500 MW capacity to one hundred and forty-seven
private companies conceptualizing wind power plants (The Republic of Turkey 2011, p 92).
With regards to hydroelectricity, the emphasis remains on privatizing and increasing
production levels. Currently, fifty-two small hydroelectric electricity production plants, with 141
MW installed capacity each, are undergoing privatization (The Republic of Turkey 2009, p 24).
Turkey’s Ninth Development Plan makes a point to vow to ensure that the investment costs
reflect true costs in order to continually attract investors, as high investment costs are associated
with these plants. This will help perpetuate investment cycles, maintain investor confidence and
prevent delays. Fortunately, as hydroelectric power is widely used in Turkey (34 percent of
energy production), creating more steering room for the private sector carries less investment
risk than Greenfield investments in, for instance, renewable energy. As such, it is reasonable to
expect success in this area. In truth, without significant foreign and private investment, Turkey
cannot easily or efficiently meet its growing energy demand. Hence the motivation to privatize
the energy sector and in turn create an attractive investment environment. Nonetheless, Turkey
would be wise to exploit renewable energy sources beyond hydroelectric, which can have
significant environmental costs, threaten the livelihood of citizens and uprooting them from their
homes, irrevocably altering natural habitats and ecosystems, and especially in the case of Turkey,
destroying cultural sites.
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Energy Efficiency
Another key component of meeting Turkey’s energy goals involves improving efficiency,
which will also help curb the ever-rising energy demand by more properly utilizing existing
supplies and resources. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources envisions reducing the
primary energy density by 20 percent (as compared to 2008 levels) by 2023 (also 100th
anniversary of the Republic of Turkey). This effort will enable a more efficient utilization of
domestic resources (The Republic of Turkey 2009). So far, the World Bank’s Renewable Energy
Loan has financed 12 energy efficiency projects in industries such as paper, petrochemicals,
plastic, and iron and steel. Developments in the efficiency arena should prove feasible, at least
initially. As Charles Hantouche described, there is much improvement to be made:
“One should know that Turkey can easily become more energy efficient […] There’s
much help from the EU to implement laws to outlaw things like inefficient refrigerators
[…] My [French] colleagues saw me [in Turkey] with the window open [in my office] in
the middle of winter, it’s unacceptable, but I had to because they had the heat on full-
blast” (Hantouche 2011).7
External Measures
Aside from meeting Turkish energy policy goals through internal solutions, many
external components play a large role. The security of supply has been an issue that Turkey has
7 Original quotation: « Faut savoir qu’en Turquie ils peuvent faire facilement l’économie de l’efficacité
énergétique […] Beaucoup d’aide de l’UE pour mettre les lois, interdire des frigos qui n’économise pas
[…] Mes collègues ont vu la fenêtre ouvert en plein d’hiver, c’est inacceptable, mais j’étais obligé
d’ouvrir la fenêtre parce qu’ils ont mis le chauffage à fond… »
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acknowledged for the past decade. Implementing solutions becomes even more pressing with
Turkey’s electricity consumption rising on average 2.5 percent per year. Turkey knows that
cutting Russia out of the picture is nearly impossible; rather it favors spreading interdependence
through the region, in order to create a symbiotic and even playing field. This combines foreign
policy and energy policy in order to prevent one player from becoming too powerful. In doing
so, one country in particular can impose less harm. Turkey has taken a proactive but idealistic
approach in implementing a foreign policy strategy, “Zero Problems with Neighbors” that aims
to eliminate strife from a historically tumultuous neighborhood. Nonetheless, Turkey has been
largely successful with this approach. With time and economic growth in both Turkey and the
region at large, Turkey’s goal of becoming an energy hub could very well become a reality. Yet,
this would assume the growth of the aforementioned even playing field with regard to energy
exchange and trade at large. In this regard, Turkey’s role is only so large, as much hangs on the
actions and decisions of other countries beyond its control.
Energy Supply Security
Turkey’s overall energy dependence rate (the amount of which is relies on foreign energy
imports) is 73 percent. Stated bluntly, this means that Turkey is energy insecure, as it relies on
foreign sources to keep it running. Such an approach can prove problematic, especially when
said sources belong to a region historically known for its political turmoil. Specific dependence
on natural gas and oil is far higher. According to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources,
in 2008 Turkey produced approximately 1 billion m³ of natural gas, while consuming 36 billion
m³, a 97% rate of import dependence (The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural
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Resources 2009, p 13-25). Natural gas is imported from Russia (about two thirds of the total),
Iran and Azerbaijan. Since 2008, natural gas has served as the largest source of primary energy
consumption, of which 52 percent is generated for electricity and 27 percent for industrial
purposes (The Republic of Turkey Council of Ministers 2010, p 107). Currently, Turkey does
not have alternative energy networks set up, although is in the process of doing so. For instance,
it isn’t until 2011-12 that nuclear energy (controversial, at best) is being explored through
Russian investments. This could further exacerbate Turkey’s supply insecurity, as they are
deliberately increasing reliance on Russian expertise and business through nuclear. On the other
hand, it could create the opposite effect, since the plants, although a Russian brain-child, will
function on and cater to Turkish soil. Nonetheless, Turkey must explore alternative energy
sources and supply routes in order to diversify beyond Russian natural gas. Even if implemented
now, it would take time and market support to avoid market failure when introducing alternative
energy sources, such as renewables, into the mix. With this concept in mind, Turkey today
cannot afford an energy shortage tomorrow. Overtime, this can change through effective policy
implementation, which remains to be seen.
Turkey also imports 90 percent of its crude oil, largely from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and
Russia (Deloitte 2010). Clearly, Turkey’s increasing energy demand coupled with an already
extremely high dependence raises a red flag.  Drastic modifications must be made in order to
meet Turkey’s long-term energy needs in a stable and secure manner. Development in a young
population foreshadows increased production and consumption, across levels; Turkey needs to
meet the inevitable increase in energy demand with market soluble and environmentally sound
solutions in order to maintain its energy goal commitments and continue working towards a
model in alignment with the Europeans. Unsurprisingly, diversification of energy resources
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remains a major priority of Turkey. This includes maximization of renewable energy potential,
exploration for additional domestic natural resource sites (exploring the Black Sea area),
expansion of natural gas pipelines within the region, as well as integrating infrastructure for
alternative sources such as nuclear.  In the words of the Ministry of Energy and Natural
Resources, “Resources, routes, and technologies will be diversified” (Deloitte 2010, p 13). In this
regard, Turkey is not so different from its European neighbors fronting similar energy
challenges, explaining its engagement in projects like Nabucco. The fact that both the EU and
Turkey prioritize improving their security of supply shows their evident insecurity.
Currently, there are multiple oil and gas pipelines running through Turkey: the domestic
crude oil pipelines Ceyhan-Kirikkaleand Batman-Dörtyol, the Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline
for natural gas, and the Iran Natural Gas pipeline, which is undergoing extension to connect
Greece with Turkey.
In June 2010 Turkey and Azerbaijan reached agreement on gas pricing and transit
through Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish, Italian and Russian companies agreed on construction of
the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The project remains inchoate, having not yet established oil
stockholding arrangements (Tekin & Williams 2009, p 9). Most recently, the Trans-Caspian Gas
Pipeline was negotiated between Turkey, Turkmenistan and the EU to carry Turkmen gas
through Turkey into Europe. These initiatives also reflect Turkey’s attentive reaction to the EU’s
need to diversify its natural gas suppliers, which indeed behooves Turkey, as it can spread its
natural gas import dependence among several different countries within the Caspian region, as
opposed to relying dominantly on Russia. In this way, Turkey moves towards securing a
domestic energy priority while increasing relations with the EU. The pipeline politics between
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Turkey, the EU and the Caspian prove to be building blocks in the new EU-Turkish relationship,
and are evidence of well exercised foreign policy by the part of Turkey, who remained
instrumental in striking deals with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. These tactics help Turkey
achieve its supply diversification goals, and engaging and improving relations with Europe, a
doubly effective methodology.
Regional and Global Influence
Building on its geographic position, Turkey ambitiously plans to situate itself as an oil
and natural gas market hub and terminal. The Ninth Development Plan and the Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources outlines Turkey’s goal  to become “a transit country between
energy producing and consuming countries by making efficient use of existing geo-strategic
location, thereby, strengthening Turkey’s geo-strategic location even more” (The Republic of
Turkey Prime Ministry State Planning Organization 2006, p 83). The Strategic Plan elaborates
this point, aiming to have 500 million barrels of oil arriving in the Ceyhan region by 2050 (as
compared to 245 million barrels in 2008), making it an energy terminal for sale to international
markets, with refineries, petroleum facilities and a liquefied natural gas exportation terminal.
Such a vision remains somewhat contradictory considering the energy policies of their
neighboring countries, a Threat identified in the Strategic Plan’s SWOT analysis.  Nonetheless,
these goals favor increased collaboration with Turkey’s neighbors, making opening the energy
chapter of EU accession negotiations seemingly inevitable, if only political barriers can be side-
stepped (The Republic of Turkey 2009, p 31). The Turkish Consul General of Chicago, Fatih
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Yildiz, describes this less as a goal, but as an element that will create itself over time under the
right circumstances:
“If the parties have the same vision shared by us, it will definitely be feasible, but we
should be able to overcome this threshold of seeing elements like economy, trade, and
energy as a means for making policies, or leverages that you can use to hurt someone, or
some country. That’s not constructive for the region, that’s why we stress to emphasize
the constructive aspects of our foreign policy. You have to commit value [sic] of
investing in this idea with your partners” (Yildiz 2012).
Mr. Yildiz maintains that Turkey as an energy hub would increase stability in the region,
which also matches their “Zero-Problems with Neighbors” foreign policy strategy, which aims to
meet the clear goal indicated in its title by improving foreign relations. He also maintains that
this is particularly important with regard to the security of supply, believing that spreading out
interdependence throughout the region, rather than depending predominantly on one source, will
take away the powerful playing cards of a country like Russia: “The perception about their
strength will decrease and they will start to act as cooperative partners. That’s why the
diversifying element is important, and for Nabucco as well” (Yildiz 2012).
Although Turkey has already made significant efforts to begin implementation of the EU
acquis, the Energy Chapter remains blocked in accession negotiations, creating little political
incentive for Turkey to implement it anyway. Nonetheless, Turkey is undergoing the finishing
touches of a long-term project to interconnect Turkey with the European electricity network
(ENTSO-E) in a permanent fashion. Turkey has committed to signing the European Energy
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Community Treaty, which would imply implementing the energy related acquis, and currently
holds “Observer” status, meaning it is expected to join in the very near future.
*
The EU and Turkey shared many common goals within their respective energy policies.
Focusing on cultivating their relationship will foster their ability to meet their respective goals,
while forging a reliable partner with similar ideals. The EU has a more advanced system in place
with regard to its 202020 strategy and the mechanisms it has created to facilitate these goals,
meanwhile Turkey is undergoing a period of transformation to blossom into an environmentally
responsible country that meets its increasing demand of its young and developing nation. The EU
offers strategic advantage to Turkey in that it can teach Turkey methods and technologies,
allowing for a more efficient energy sector transformation. Turkey holds strategic advantage
with regard to it capacity to construct pipelines within is territory that will diversify natural gas
supply, as well its capacity for renewable energy.  Each possesses unique assets and qualities
that, if shared, would allow for both countries to further their goals more effectively. The
subsequent chapter will explore the complexity of the relations between the two entities,
highlighting details which prevent partnership as well as those that privilege it, as well as
pragmatic solutions to be considered by both sides to better fulfill their goals and cultivate a
more beneficial relationship with one another.
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CHAPTER 4
FULL ENERGY PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY: MISSION
IMPOSSIBLE?
By evaluating the EU’s and Turkey’s respective energy policies, several common
interests and goals rise to the surface. Most, although approached and strategized in different
ways by both entities, align with each other. Both the EU and Turkey prioritize diversifying their
energy suppliers and routes, combating climate change, and improving their markets. Both
envision a developed energy sector business market, gaining regional power and partnerships
and meeting energy demand with sustainable technologies and methods. The two don’t seem so
ill-suited for one another. Based on the aforementioned goals enshrined in each entity’s energy
policy, the following objective proves pragmatic: an energy based rapprochement between
Turkey and the EU.
Closer relations and a closer partnership would allow both sides to take great strides
towards their respective goals. Although this rapprochement should occur in stages, it should
lead to full harmonization of their energy networks and market. De facto, this requires
harmonized regulation and political cooperation. To achieve this objective, three main
components should be accomplished, and will be explored in the subsequent Policy Mechanisms
Chapter; cooperation to diversify suppliers, combat climate change, and improve both
multilateral and bilateral activities and participation.
By achieving the aforementioned, Turkey and the EU will reach an objective of vital
importance for both of them; complete energy partnership. This demands working towards
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common energy goals and sharing energy values. With a complete energy partnership, pipeline
projects like Nabucco will be more navigable, the EU will adding another reliable partner to the
electricity network, building upon renewable energy potential, and also gain access to the
positive relations which Turkey enjoys with its neighbors in the Caspian region. This
corresponds with EU energy policy goals. From Turkey’s end, this energy partnership would
help develop the Turkish energy sector, fully liberalize its market, provide solutions to its own
import and energy diversification needs, as well as methods to improve energy efficiency, carbon
emission reduction, and financial and innovative support to incorporate renewable energy into
the production portfolio. Through pipeline projects, collaboration on combating climate change
and both bilateral and multilateral engagement, positive fallout will ensue, bringing Turkey’s
energy sector up to speed, hence forging a better partnership between Turkey and the EU.
Solidified partnership between Turkey and the EU would contribute to regional stability
and welfare, diversify natural gas suppliers, and combine efforts to reduce climate change. In the
process, these means also transform Turkey’s institutional set-up and regulatory structure
through adopting EU methods and signing agreements. By bringing Turkey’s energy sector up to
EU standards, domestic goals become more attainable, and Turkey therefore becomes a stronger
partner economically. This would in turn have a positive effect on business exchanges.
With specific regard to energy, one recent development includes electricity; Turkey is
due to join the European Electricity Network (ENTSO-E), whereupon the EU and Turkey can
trade electricity. With continued partnership and a veritable rapprochement between the two,
Turkey’s renewable energy potential could be realized. With a developed and powerful
renewable energy sector and a permanent connection to ENTSO-E, the EU would have another
means to incorporate renewable energy share.
53
The Common Ground
Although one might argue that the EU will enjoy energy supply security via Turkey
regardless of a rapprochement, the massive and complex nature of such projects must be
properly considered. Aiming to achieve means such as pipeline projects without a greater vision
for full energy partnership between the EU and Turkey proves unwise. Firstly, the agreements
are not one sided; just as the EU needs to secure their energy supply, Turkey does as well.
Meeting mutual needs demands partnership.  As Ashti Hawrami, Minister of Natural Resources,
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, said at the Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum
(BSEEF) in 2011: “If the transistor, in this case, is the Republic of Turkey, is not secure about
their own energy security, don't expect them just to be a courier of gas to Europe”. In order for
pipeline plans to work, the EU needs to help ensure that Turkey’s needs are met as well. After
all, Turkey is as addicted foreign natural gas as Europe, which both having a particular taste for
the Russian product. Instead of acting independently, Europe must act with Turkey (Hawrami
2011). Fatih Yildiz emphasized the cohesiveness of the EU and Turkey’s needs and goals during
a personal interview with the author:
“The main thing we all rely on is natural gas, therefore our effort to diversify our sources
and roots for energy corresponds quite well with the vision of the Europeans to create
another corridor [Nabucco][…]”
He continues by explaining that diversification has been a priority throughout the past
decade, for the purpose of fostering stability. The idea that diversification will foster symbiotic
interdependence and palliate one sided dependencies prevails:
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“It matches our general foreign policy, we believe in increasing the interdependence in a
generic way, creating interdependencies between parties in the region, which will be an
added value for the stability in the region. […] This goes well with our EU perspective as
well, where we look eye to eye with the Europeans is to diversify sources” (Yildiz 2012).
Quite clearly, Turkish cooperation in this regard appears strong and promising to achieve
the mutual goals between the EU and Turkey.
Furthermore, Fatih Baltaci, Founder and Chairman of the Akfel Group, an energy
engineering industry leader, pointed out during the BSEEF that while pipeline agreements are in
the best interest of European and Turkish security, Turkey’s participation isn’t to be taken for
granted.  He says: “I respect and we enjoy the partnership with Europeans. I enjoy doing
business with them, but they have to understand that in the context of the Turkey (sic) is not a
part of the Europe, I – as a pragmatic businessman, I don't see what should be the Turkey's (sic)
concern for the security of energy of Europe, for the sake of what. So there should be
compromise, has to be brought on the table (sic)” (Baltaci 2011). His viewpoint is not
uncommon amongst Turks, disoriented from the stalling accession agreements between Turkey
and the EU. The implications of his opinion are important and clear; both sides need one another,
but a greater rapprochement is in order for the relationship to bear fruit. With such long term gas
pipeline commitments being made, Turkey and the EU need to be clear on what they expect from
one another, and most importantly, they need to become more than simple business partners. The
implications of these objectives have become greater and more profound than strict business. In
order for such comprehensive and large scale projects to succeed, the EU and Turkey need to
harmonize their actions and commitments with regard to energy; this of course requires policy
solutions.
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Scholars such as Tekin & Williams support this idea. They concur that “mammoth
infrastructural undertakings as the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector or the Nabucco Pipeline
would require the higher standardization and integration of regulatory environments
characteristic of political union […] and require less ambivalence on Turkey’s accession
(Tekin& Williams 2009, p 14).
Meanwhile, Turkey, which lacks the financial and regulatory frameworks to develop this
sector alone, benefits by virtue of existing as an EU candidate country aiming to join.
Implementing the acquis, joining the Energy Community, the ENTSO-E network are all steps in
the right direction, both to develop Turkey and bring it closer to meeting accession negotiation
requirements. With these actions underway, the logical benefits of a full and comprehensive
energy partnership are salient, yet such large benefits absolutely require substantial integration.
Like anything, it involves risk and trade-offs. Nonetheless, from observation of Turkey’s
development since its candidacy in 1999, as the EU and Turkey become more united, Turkey
becomes stronger, which in turn makes the EU stronger through its stable partnership with a
stable country.
Why not Laissez-Faire?
Although the private market remains an absolutely essential component for reaching the
aforementioned objectives necessary to forge a full energy partnership between the EU and
Turkey, they can only be achieved through supranational activity and coordination. A free
market alone cannot induce supplier diversification, combat climate change, and engage in
integrative external governance tactics. Nor can it forge a politically and culturally sensitive
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partnership. The free market favors that which is profitable, and answers only to supply and
demand. At present, and in general, constructing alternative supply routes, combating climate
change, and financially supporting external countries are not profitable in immediate terms.
Investments are of high risk with elevated upfront costs. Therefore, rational supply and demand
will not favor these investments, making market failure an imminent threat. As such, political
leadership and public expenditure is necessary in order to encourage and stimulate investment
and confidence in this realm. Action is needed at the supranational level in order to introduce
these investments into the European internal market. Fragmented support across member states
will not undermine this entirely, but delay it. For example, if countries eventually fully liberalize
their markets and become first movers in the field of renewable energy, other countries will jump
on the bandwagon once this niche becomes profitable. At present, the positive externalities of
doing so are often overlooked, creating a cost-benefit analysis whereupon time-inconsistent
preferences create a discrepancy between long and short term benefits. In reality, the positive
externalities of renewable energy are substantial, both to the public and private, and would
expectedly follow a classic Sigmoid Curve analysis, whereupon costs and risks are high upfront
but which even out and become profitable benefits over time. This is especially true for first
movers in a sector or country, but as the EU (and Turkey) are connected to the same electricity
network and are in the process of constructing common natural gas pipelines, this concept
underlines the benefits to be enjoyed at levels which transcend borders.
Giorgos Papaconstantinou, Minister of Energy, Environment and Climate Change,
Hellenic Republic expressed a similar point during the Black Sea Economic Forum: “We see that
the country that manages to convince and be the first of the track (sic), the first on the road with
a credible solution on both traditional and renewable energy will manage to slowly become what
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is in effect a hub for the region”(Papaconstantinou 2011). Not only would the first mover
stimulate the market activity, the first mover would become an energy hub for import and export
activity.
Mr. Papaconstantinou also maintains that the support and leadership of elected officials is
paramount to furthering these goals. With regard to renewable energy, the market doesn’t
appraise the appropriate value to the long-term benefits of these investments for society. Again,
without governments offering subsidies to introduce renewable energy, the goods are subject to
market failure due to time-inconsistent preferences. Equally as important are efforts to foster
both public and private and support, in order to ensure that all actors are aware of what is at
stake, and more importantly, what is to be gained.
Ambassador Pierre Morel, EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Council of the
European Union describes the beginning of the cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan
when their presidents, President Gül and President Aliyev, respectively, sat together at the South
Corridor Summit in Prague in 2009. This serves as an example of how cooperation between
governments is necessary to forward even a project with a significant reliance for private
investment. The first steps need to be made from the top. He emphasizes the necessity to balance
the roles of private companies and markets with governmental steering and control: “We are in a
situation where the decisions have to be made by the great operators. The governments and the
organizations have to deliver the best possible characteristics in order to make it viable, credible,
long-term and, once again, strategic” (Morel 2011). Only with appropriate decision making at the
governmental level will business investment flourish. Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Prime Minister
and State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Georgia verifies the necessity for
government support as well in discussing the Nabucco project: “ Insurances from governments
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are important and encouragement from governments’ side is also important for this kind of
strategic projects because when we talk about this type of projects, except the resources itself, I
think we need to – not to forget about the interests of diversification, not to be dependent on one
source alone” (Baramidze 2011). Mr. Baramidze emphasizes an important point; business
interests will invest where they can and where it is profitable, but the reason they will invest in
Nabucco remains because their countries need it and their governments have agreed to it.
Furthermore, supporting the aforementioned notion of Fatih Yildiz, Consul General of Chicago,
that diversification is important not only for business reasons but stability as well—with a more
evenly distributed portfolio of imports and exports, the notion of ‘one great power’ or ‘giant’
dissipates. In other words, a country like Russia becomes less powerful as it is less needed.
Certainly, neither the EU, Turkey, nor the author maintains that removing Russia from the
picture could be possible; nonetheless, a lesser dependence is prudent.
Therefore, without the government setting the agenda, business investment would follow
the interests of the small and favor pre-existing arrangements and suppliers. With political
agreements delving into new territory, business investment can expand into new areas and
support the long term strategy set forth by the government.
During the same conference session, Harry Sachinis, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, DEPA, Greece’s public gas corporation, emphasized the integral component of EU
involvement in achieving energy security goals within the EU and the surrounding region, by
highlighting the fact that the European Commission negotiated the Trans-Caspian project treaty,
a demonstration of supra-nationality in energy policy that has no precedent (Sachinis 2011).
Certainly, as CEO of a large public company undergoing privatization, Mr. Sachinis values the
commercial component in this process, which he states underpins the pipeline’s construction to
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begin with. Some of his commentary applies both to private and public power: “If we are serious
about a common European market for energy, we need to invest in it. And investing in it means
alternative gas routes and alternative routes for renewable energy” (Sachinis 2011).
Financial investment must be made both privately and publicly for European energy
policy goals to be achieved, just as political investments at the government and supranational
levels must be made in order for proposed and implemented policies to have any successful or
significant effect. If twenty seven member states employ different energy regulations and
strategies, they may move in the same direction but at staggered paces, or in entirely different
directions. Either result produces less efficient and less desirable outcomes.
With regard to renewable energy, the idea used to be nation-specific. In other words,
countries regarded renewable energy as a nation-sensitive investment and sector. However, with
advances in the efficiency of renewable energy, discussion has become transnational. When the
sector is cultivated, a classic economy of scale situation will develop wherein cost advantages
appear as output and consumption increase across borders. Certain renewable energies, such as
solar, can be imported and exported as electricity through the same electricity network. With
Turkey connected to the ENTSO-E, EU countries could import renewable energy from Turkey.
This of course would be beneficial for both entities. Arriving at this point would imply
development of Turkey’s energy sector, which demands large and substantial investment as well
as institutional reform. Implementing the EU acquis would foster this, and EU investment would
make the development of the sector possible. With a vital sector in Turkey developed, it could
help meet its rising energy demand while stalling carbon emission; the EU would improve its
share of renewable energy, and earn its status as a global leader in combating climate change
through normative power and assistance to developing economies.
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However, again, such drastic waves of change cannot be created by the market alone.
These large-scale, long-term and high capital ventures require government support. Once in
place, the market would dictate its longevity. But again, with EU mandates to use renewable
energy, this forces investment into renewable energy. Whether the EU itself could negotiate with
Turkey to develop this sector remains unclear. EU level support would certainly expedite the
process. In addition, Turkey has not exploited nuclear energy whatsoever in Turkey, but is
currently conceptualizing two plants with Russian investment. Again, with Turkey connected to
the ENTSO-E, the EU could benefit from investing in nuclear energy in Turkey, with an added
benefit of competing with Russia. Connecting to the ENTSO-E was an EU led initiative, setting
the stage for business to profit from this interconnectivity.
Nonetheless, energy policy is a governmental security matter; therefore, it demands
strategic and effective leadership from the top. A balance between private and public investment,
as well as supranational political cohesiveness is conducive to successfully driving the means
described in this chapter to reach the objective of full energy partnership between the EU and
Turkey.
*
This chapter explored the ways in which greater harmonization is necessary within the
EU but also externally, in its interactions with Turkey. Several initiatives are already underway,
such as the ENTSO-E interconnecting Turkey to the European electricity transmission network.
This could have positive prospects with regard to renewable energy, wherein Turkey’s renewable
energy potential could be utilized to appease local demand in tandem with exporting renewable
energy to Europe. That way, generated energy that isn’t in demand can be exported to the EU,
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which would reduce waste while helping the EU incorporate renewable energy into eastern
countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, which face greater barriers to setting up renewable
energy technology than Sweden, for example. This concept will be elaborated in the following
chapter.
Renewable energy also much be cushioned through incentives, as discussed in this
chapter, in order to avert the inconvenient truths of overlooking positive externalities and time
inconsistent preferences associated with renewable energy. As such, public expenditure is
necessary in the form of incentives and subsidies to ease markets into accepting renewable
technology and phasing out oil, coal or other classically cost effective yet environmentally
harmful resources.  Finally, Turkey and the EU truly see ‘eye to eye’, in the words of the Turkish
Consul General in Chicago, with regard to diversifying energy supply, an area in which political
unity form the EU would facilitate further progress for projects such as Nabucco. The details
behind this situation will be explored subsequently. Nonetheless, the partnership between the EU
and Turkey is budding and bound to bloom.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY MECHANISMS
In order to achieve full energy partnership with the EU, Turkey needs to implement
various measures to reform its institutions, regulatory system and improve its energy policy. The
EU can play a large role in fostering these accomplishments. However, the EU itself needs to
overcome political barriers and conflicts of sovereignty versus supra-nationality in order to
convey legitimate leadership and welcome Turkey as a partner. Meanwhile, initiated projects and
policy endeavors must be completed, but as this research will argue, the success of these depends
on greater political and institutional merging between the EU and Turkey.
To start, the Nabucco pipeline is paramount. The project is already in the works; yet
various barriers must still be surmounted. Nabucco and similar projects of interconnection within
Europe will facilitate the EU’s goal of diversifying suppliers. Secondly, the conception that
climate change knows no borders must be implemented in full. This goes beyond the EU’s
internal mechanisms to reduce emissions, improve renewable use and efficiency, but transcends
to the regional and even global level. Organizations like the TEN-E possess immense
importance, as they can fund projects that will both benefit the EU and other regions as well.
Specifically, renewable energy projects in Turkey qualify and should be explored. Turkey must
also take action to proactively pursue its energy policy and become a better partner to Europe.
One such means to an end involves joining the European Energy Community. With Observer
status, Turkey is expected to join and implement the entire energy related aquis. Such a move
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will bring Turkey up to speed with the EU, only facilitating their partnership. While the EU does
engage Turkey in some respects, such as the Franco-Euro-Turkish Twinning project, which
reformed Turkey’s electricity sector to prepare for interconnection with the ENTSO-E, Turkey
also needs to make sure that its political and economic infrastructure is in place to meet is
proclaimed goals, such as reducing its coal-induced carbon footprint. Once again, the facts reveal
that the EU and Turkey have much to offer one another through cooperation.
Building the Pipelines
One vital project that must realized is the Nabucco pipeline project. From an EU
perspective, as Tekin & Williams (2009, 15) aptly point out; Nabucco’s true purpose is to side-
step crossing through Russian territory to import natural gas. EU energy imports depend on
Russia, Russian controlled-exports, the Caspian Basin and North Africa. Therefore,
diversification would entail increasing imports from the Middle East, such as Egypt, Iran and
Iraq, and creating independent access to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for energy
supplies. However, a successful Nabucco pipeline project inherently assumes productive and
close EU –Turkey relations. The authors note: “A Turkish energy corridor offers one of the only
feasible modes of connecting a greater diversity of suppliers to Europe along a larger number of
secure and independent routes”. Ergo, for energy acquisition security, Turkey’s geographic
position possesses a new strategic value to the European Union, adding a new dimension to the
two entities’ partnership.
Nabucco exists as the single most promising supply diversification project, despite its
flaws.  This Unique European Flagship Project “provides a predictable, long term concept over
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50 years backed by an IGA for gas transit via Turkey which is compatible with European Energy
Laws” (Mitzcheck 2012). No other project will “provide a gas transport volume of 31 bcm/year
to gas producers from Central Asian and Middle East from alternative sources directly into the
center of the European markets […] and reach such a high number of shippers, industrial users,
wholesalers at competitive conditions in the European market” (Mitzcheck 2012). Indeed, once
implemented, Nabucco should prove very profitable, as Ambassador Pierre Morel said: “So then,
let the consortium and the different interests enter into consideration. But I would just recall to
finish (sic) that, I mean, the value of Nabucco is to go to Baumgarten and beyond. That is at the
core of the 500 million market (sic)” (Morel 2011). The take away remains that despite differing
interests and wavering support from several EU members, Nabucco is designed to make money;
this will greatly benefit its supports, and likely tempt non-supporters to cross over.
The Mott MacDonald report, “Supplying the EU Natural Gas Market” of November
2010 depicts the internal motivations for the EU’s energy diversification priorities; EU natural
gas imports will steadily rise, from 300 bcm per year in 2005 to 450 bcm per year in 2030, while
production steadily falls (MacDonald 2010, p 16-17).
As mentioned previously, Turkey too needs to diversify its energy supply and includes
this in its energy policy strategy. In order to achieve mutual goals and become compatible energy
partners, the pipeline projects long negotiated between the EU, Turkey, and supplier nations such
as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq must be made into reality. So far, both the EU and Turkey
have made several large steps beyond conversations and towards construction.
First and foremost, the Nabucco pipeline project is live, signed in 2009. The project will
help both Turkey and the EU engage in business with various suppliers other than Russia.
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Nabucco will run from Turkey into Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, ending in Austria near a
gas hub in Baumgarten.  There are two feeder lines undergoing conceptualization to supply the
natural gas. The first would lie at the Turkish/Georgian border and the second at the
Turkish/Iraqi border. Involved parties have signed the legal agreements, and construction is due
to start in 2013, envisioning completion by 2020. The geographic route of the pipeline can be
seen in Figure 2 at the end of this chapter (Nabucco Gas Pipeline 2012).
Nabucco will increase competition, between private gas supplier companies, which
should push down prices and encourage interaction between the EU and Turkey; simultaneously
developing the internal energy market while furthering the relationship between the EU and
Turkey. Turkey in particular will benefit greatly, with more liquidity in its energy market from
interconnection with the European market and access to new gas producer countries.
Specifically, fifty percent of Nabucco’s capacity will be auctioned amongst shareholders, and the
remaining half reserved for third party access. This should also serve to improve producer
independence through expanding gas buying customers. Additionally, the project envisions
enhancing market liquidity through issuance of short term contracts for ten percent of capacity.
From a business and energy market perspective, Nabucco will drastically increase cohesiveness
between the EU and Turkey. Most importantly, the pipeline will serve as a major solution to the
EU and Turkey’s energy acquisition security woes (Nabucco Gas Pipeline 2012).
The European Investment Bank and The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development have agreed to fund 70 percent of the $5-6 billion cost of Nabucco (Tekin &
Williams 2009b, p349-350), co-financed by the Neighborhood Investment Fund (Tekin &
Williams 2009, p 11).
66
As a result of Turkey’s ratification of the Nabucco intergovernmental agreement in
August 2010, favorable reports regarding the EU’s security of supply in relation to Turkey have
arisen in official publications, such as the Energy Community, indicating positive energy
relations on the forefront as well as undertones of improved accession negotiations.
Accomplishing the Nabucco project to this point has been no stranger to drama or
controversy, and still faces barriers. While imperative to note the existence and significance of
many political arguments, which remain beyond the focus of this research, the greatest point of
interest remained “who would supply the gas”? With political instability rampant in natural gas
giants Iran and Iraq, Nabucco, ironically similar to the reason for its inception, needs to diversify
its suppliers. In the past two years significant progress has been made due to increased political
cooperation, and perhaps, amplified desperation. The most important takeaway is recognition of
Turkey’s vital importance in the resolution of these issues, and the implications of their ability
and willingness to negotiate contracts in the best interest of themselves and the EU. Certainly,
the latter observation contains significant implications for the success or failure of a
rapprochement between Turkey and the EU. The nature of the Nabucco project demands de facto
long term cooperation and partnership, inherent in the scale and cost of such a project, not to
mention the vital utility of what it will carry to both societies. The following actions by Turkey
mark a progression towards cooperative partnership with the EU, for the sake of their dual, or
perhaps combined, energy security interests.
In June 2010 Turkey and Azerbaijan reached agreement on gas pricing and transit
through Turkey. This action was seen very positively by the European Community. Harry
Sachinis, DEPA CEO, expressed that “the agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey for transit
through Turkey […] really establishes Turkey as a reliable partner both for Caspian countries
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and for European countries” (Sachinis 2011). The associated pipeline is the South Caucasus
Pipeline (SCP), bringing natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey through Georgia. Currently,
conceptualization is underway to use the Turkey-Greece connector to hook the SCP to the EU.
However, at present, Turkey maintains discretion to sell the gas it receives through this pipeline
to Europe or elsewhere. An important means to the security of supply end is to solidify this
partnership and connect the SCP to the EU.
Turkey also agreed to absorb the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), involving Egypt, Jordan and
Syria into its territory, whereupon it could be connected to Nabucco. Finally, and most recently,
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline was contracted between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and the EU,
which will bring gas from Turkmenistan under the Caspian Sea into Turkey, connecting to the
Nabucco pipeline. From a EU perspective, this is viewed as one of the greatest achievements to
date of EU energy policy. The agreement exists as the first EU backed infrastructure regulation.
Furthermore, all twenty seven member states voted to give the European Commission
negotiating power for the purposes of this treaty, validating the supranational utility of
negotiating with a single voice on the behalf of the EU (Holzne 2011).
Longstanding criticisms against Nabucco included the lack of Turkemenistan’s
participation as a supplier: “However, a major problem in that area is that the EU has not yet
convinced Turkmenistan to use the pipeline, which leads to the continuation of the EU’s
dependency on Russia. It is highly likely that the EU would need Turkey’s support in its
relations with Turkmenistan” (Müfltuler-Baç 2008, p 71). Turkey’s interaction with
Turkmenistan, who enjoys a long history of relations, was invaluable in obtaining the Trans-
Caspian agreement, as well as for the feasibility of Nabucco. The aforementioned actions
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demonstrate a marked increase in strategic cooperation between Turkey and the EU, and
engagement with the Caspian region. Furthermore, these actions bring the EU and Turkey a few
steps closer to mollifying their energy import woes, and one step closer to existing as a happier
couple. In order to continue sailing in friendly waters, the EU and Turkey must continue working
together to see the Nabucco project properly executed and developed. Only then will their
respective markets and energy supply be stable and secure.
Policy Recommendation
There is no denying an overall European agenda to diversify energy suppliers and routes.
However, not all countries subscribe to this, and run their own energy policies. Member states
pursue their country’s own interests through bilateral private deals. This is often a result of
historical actions and political preferences. As previously mentioned, France, for example, will
not support Nabucco since it runs predominantly through Turkey, a country France has displayed
vehement opposition to with regard to its candidacy to the EU. Geography plays another role;
especially with regard to natural gas, which must be transported through a pipeline (with the
exception of liquefied natural gas), nations utilize supply routes which are the most direct and
logical. In other cases, supply routes simply do not exist between certain countries. Italy, for
instance, will not be connected to the Nabucco pipeline, and will continue importing from
Russia, and therefore wants to maintain positive relations with Russia. Supporting the Nabucco
project could undermine these relations.
Yet, this means that while Nabucco consortium stakeholders invest all their energy to
make the project a reality, other countries continue striking bilateral deals with Russia,
undermining any conception of an “EU” project to diversify energy suppliers away from Russia.
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This also creates diverging waves of support for Nabucco. Countries that don’t need Nabucco
gas don’t need to support Turkey; in fact they can work against Turkey, or at least, behind the
scenes or in convoluted ways. In reality, they work against their fellow EU member states, for
they undermine the bargaining power and legitimacy of the Nabucco project by attacking the
catalyst of the solution.
Therefore, in order to truly avert natural gas energy supply insecurity, the EU needs to
adopt a more harmonized energy supply policy. At at the Peoria Area World Affairs Council,
Jennone Walker, Former Ambassador to the Czech Republic and Special Advisor to President
William Clinton and Senior Director for Europe to the National Security Council, Washington,
DC said: “Russian power for natural gas is a great threat! It is more important for the EU to stand
up to Russia as a unit, and unfortunately Germany and other EU members have been willing at
times to strike unilateral deals with Russia”. She goes on to describe that adopting common
energy policy, especially with relations to Russia, will prove to be an important test for the EU’s
security (PAWAC 2012).
Currently, the extent of Community law in this domain extends to the reporting
mechanisms required and in place for member states to communicate to the Commission
regarding their suppliers and amounts. The Commission maintains no jurisdiction over the
suppliers that member states choose. Although it would be unrealistic to suggest taking all
sovereignty away from member state’s supplier choices, due to political and geographic reasons,
measures can be taken at the EU level to encourage member states to diversify their suppliers.
The EU could not expect member states to diversify its suppliers if geographically and physically
pipelines are not available to support this. However, with EU expenditure, pipeline
interconnector projects could be pursued, increasing the choice among countries and their
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consumers. This would prevent certain member states from becoming completely dependent on
one singular nation; in turn fostering greater interdependence between a myriad of suppliers,
therefore allowing for greater security. The assumption is that the existence of more suppliers
lessens the possibility of all suppliers failing or blocking the supply. Another assumption
involves the existence of multiple suppliers pushing down prices and improving quality through
competition, allowing the consumer to purchase from companies who supply reliable, high
quality and fairly prices products.
With such an infrastructure in place, the building blocks to negotiate requiring
diversification of suppliers for all member states could arise. This would align with the EU’s
initiative to diversify suppliers overall. The EU could accumulate the finances for these
measures by redistributing the EU budget. Already, the conceptualized budget for 2014-2020
predicts 20 percent of funds to be dedicated to combating climate change. Supply diversification
projects would certainly fit into this framework, creating many European jobs along the way.
With more projects like Nabucco, countries can join a comprehensive natural gas network of
importation, transfer and storage. As such, the policy recommendation becomes circular,
requiring first a pipeline success story before steps towards a more harmonized policy could
feasibly come about.
Overall, the foundations of the Nabucco project are set, and commitments have been
made. The project should prove to be a long term success, especially in the wake of the recent
Trans-Caspian Agreement. Both Turkey and the EU will benefit greatly from Nabucco, an truly
such a project could not be conceived without full participation and long-term commitment from
both sides. As such, Nabucco exists as the cornerstone of a new EU-Turkish energy partnership;
it has, and will continue to break down barriers.
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Nonetheless, member states still maintain their rightful sovereignty, and continue to
exercise it. It remains unclear as to whether the EU could diminish national sovereignty in
energy policy in the near future. However, the EU could easily contribute funds to member states
to enable them to diversify their supply, and later legislate requirements to diversify suppliers for
the sake of Europe’s energy security at large. Such mechanisms should be implemented as soon
as possible, in tandem with the construction of Nabucco.
Climate Change Transcends Borders: a Collaborative Effort
Knowledge and understanding of climate change has greatly increased over the past few
decades. Countries are finally beginning to understand that while national and regional measures
are indeed in order, climate change itself does not know borders. As such, comprehensive and
collaborative approaches must be taken in order to secure a sustainable future for the generations
to come.
At its foundation, the EU’s approach to climate change does not pertain exclusively to its
own borders, as it has made clear through its various initiatives to become a regional influence
and normative actor in this regard. Certainly, the EU maintains European goals within this
context, but also views combating climate change as a global and comprehensive affair,
demanding responsibility from all nations. As such, engaging Turkey in becoming a more
proactive contributor in the fight against climate change fits directly into the EU’s encompassing
approach. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that increased cooperation with Turkey would
allow the EU to have a stronger voice and influence in promoting sustainable development in
Turkey. The EU should capitalize on this opportunity; as it stands several benefits in doing so.
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Aside from purely altruistic and normatively based motivations to develop renewable
energy in Turkey, the enormous renewable energy potential within Turkey must be
acknowledged. Specifically, solar energy holds great promise. According to Mr. André-Jacques
Auberton-Hervé, Chairman and Executive Officer, Soitec SA, developing solar energy in Turkey
is feasible, profitable, and will foster development in the country at large. Notably, the “sun
regions” of Turkey would produce enough solar power for their region’s local electricity needs.
Furthermore, this would stimulate a renewable energy hub that could import, export and transfer
renewable energy. Clearly Europe and Turkey have a strong benefit to work together in
renewable (Auberton-Hervé 2011). According to European regulations, Article 9 and 6 countries
connected to European grid can contribute to the overall European renewable energy policy;
Turkey falls into this category.
Specifically, Turkey is synchronizing its regulations with the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), considering the transition as an
advantage to Turkey’s electricity market: “to operate the electricity system in a more economic,
qualified and reliable manner by sharing backup” (The Republic of Turkey 2011, p 91). De
facto, this encourages closer cooperation with Europe on energy. Following a technical and
administrative structural reforms operation from September 2010 to 2011, the EU and ENTSO-E
authorized limited capacity electricity trade among Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria.8 According to
Charles Hantouche, director of the EU-Turkey Twinning Project for RTE in France, “It is well
known that [joining] the electricity [network] is the first sign of integrating a country into the
European Union”.9 Mr. Hantouche continued that as of 2012, Turkey’s network is expected to be
8400 MW from Europe to Turkey and 300 MW from Turkey to Europe.
9 Original Quotation : C’est connu que l’électricité c’est le premier signe de l’intégration d’un pays dans l’Union
Européen
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permanently connected to Europe’s. Mr. Hantouche also outlined Turkey’s interest in knowledge
sharing with Europe, and in this particular example, France.
The European Commission financed a French-run electrical network twinning project in
Turkey in 2010, with great success. The relationship continues through frequent over-the-counter
projects, such as the following: “They [Turkey] asked us to show how things function in France,
so we held a Workshop [in Istanbul]. They have a lot of renewable energy [potential], solar and
wind, they wanted to know how to properly connect these energies to the [electricity] network.
All of this is thanks to this cooperation”. 10 Hantouche emphasizes that these projects are
pioneered with a long-term strategy approach to achieve long term transformative goals; showing
that even France is taking a step towards engaging Turkey, bringing them, for better or for
worse, towards an ever closer union. With full interconnection on the near horizon, both entities
will be able to buy, sell and share electricity from the same network, creating ‘free movement of
trade’ via electricity.
Mr. Auberton-Hervé maintains that Turkey’s strong sun source, industrial system and
ecosystem provides conditions for high solar efficiency and transferring the electricity at an
industrial scale. He optimistically states: “We perceive Turkey as a good part of the renewable
energy contribution to the world. Don’t forget, you know, the world has a Sun Belt […] where
the sun is delivering 10,000 times more than what the world needs in terms of energy. The sun is
10 Original Quotation : Ils ont demandé pour nous de montrer comment on fait en France , on a fait un workshop.
Avec énergies renouvelables, ils ont beaucoup d’énergie renouvelable, solaire et éolienne. Ils voulaient savoir
comment s’accorder ses énergies aux réseaux. Voudraient que nous les informons et présenter un peu comment on
fait pour donner l’accès aux réseaux pour les énergies solaires. Comment on fait pour raccorder des énergies
éoliennes. Tout ça aussi c’est due à cette coopération.
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the only unlimited renewable source of energy and it happens it’s delivered in the Sun Belt”
(Auberton-Hervé 2011). Indeed, Turkey is located in the Sun Belt.
With this known potential, the EU must make efforts to engage Turkey through
normative and bilateral external governance strategies. One current example includes the Trans-
European Network for Energy (TEN-E) Programme, which urges accelerated development of
“renewable energy projects of European interest”. The program notes that “Particular attention
should be paid to renewable energy projects that will contribute to a significant increase in
security of energy supply in the Community and neighboring countries (Directive 28/2009 Para
58)”. Currently, the EU reserves 25 million Euros a year for gas and electricity feasibility studies
of European interest. Using this funding to invest in Turkey’s renewable sector, such as solar,
would behoove both Turkey and the EU. With powerful full-time sun and Turkey part of the
ENTSO-E, the EU could import solar powered electricity. This in turn would stimulate investor
confidence in the renewable sector, creating beneficial fallout for renewable energy on a global
scale.
Policy Recommendation
Although Turkey has a large renewable energy potential, which in turn can be presented
as a prime location for the EU to extend its leadership, normative power, and invest in renewable
energy in desirable conditions for it to flourish, this requires EU level support and investment.
The aforementioned recommendation of EU energy supply policy would foster the trading
transactions between Turkey and the EU for renewable energy. However, this first requires both
EU and private investment, whereupon the EU should resolve to contribute large financial
support through the TEN-E.
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Financial support from the TEN-E will assist Turkey to achieve its energy policy goals.
For example, Turkey remains very carbon intensive. For Turkey to become a more attractive
investment location and overall better energy partner it needs to make a commitment to clean
coal technologies and keeping emissions to a minimum. Coal corresponds to about 30% of
primary energy consumption in Turkey, with typically one half produced domestically. Turkey
plans to construct 3,500 Mega Watts (MW) of coal thermal plants by 2013 to exploit domestic
coal reserves. Furthermore, exploration projects from 2000-2009 discovered 4.2 billion tons of
lignite reserves, increasing reserves by 50 percent. As such, domestic coal production will rise.
At present, Turkey has stipulated that production will use clean coal practices in order to
minimize negative carbon consequences and honor global initiatives to reduce climate change.
However, this policy stipulation must be enforced concretely and ensured in order to curb the
negative impact Turkey’s coal consumption would have on the environment. Turkey should
require all new coal plants to utilize clean coal technologies.
Without such requirements, the EU will be dramatically less inclined to partner with
Turkey—once again showcasing the benefit of implementing the aquis. One of Turkey’s greatest
advantages lies in the fact that Turkey possesses large renewable energy potential with near
perfect conditions to develop it; with the right incentives the EU could help make this a reality,
in turn benefiting both Turkey’s electricity production methods and the EU’s.
Furthermore, Turkey needs to set an energy efficiency goal, similar to the EU’s goal of
reducing consumption, or improving efficiency, by twenty percent by 2020. Mr. Hantouche
vouches for the pressing need of such reforms : “When they had the heat on we all were red
[sweating] […] My colleagues [from France] saw my window open in the middle of winter,
which is unacceptable, but I was forced to open it because the heat was on full blast” (Hantouche
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2011).11 Mr. Hantouche describes here that his office in Istanbul was overheated since the
building’s heating circuit was outdated, and did not allow for controlling of the temperature in
individual rooms. He continues:
“They have a lot of work to do in this regard. Every year they increase their electricity
demand by 7-10 percent, an increase like that, that means additional management,
construction of centrales, more electricity lines, all of this is expensive, and yet, they have
ways to reduce consumption. They can save a lot of energy through their conduct. That
said, it isn’t the 80’s, they can benefit from the past experiences of others [industrialized
countries]”.12
Since Turkey is just now developing as a country, enjoying an increase in wealth and
business development, it possesses more opportunities to improve energy efficiency. For
example, construction of buildings as cities grow and regions urbanize in tandem with
development should install industry-standard heating and cooling systems to allow for efficient
consumption. They cans also implement motion censored lights to ensure that lights do not
remain on when they aren’t utilized. ‘Green’ standards can and must be implemented across
Turkish industries. This would also open new areas of expertise for Turkish businesses, creating
11 Original quotation: Mes collègues ont vu la fenêtre ouvert en plein d’hiver, c’est inacceptable, mais j’étais obligé
d’ouvrir la fenêtre parce qu’ils ont mis le chauffage à fond…
12Original quotation: « Ils ont beaucoup de travail dans ce sens là. Chaque année ils doivent augmenter le besoin
d’électricité entre 7 et 10%  chaque année, augmenter comme ça, ça veut dire la gestion en plus, construire des
centrale en plus, mettre les lignes en plus, tout ça coute cher, et ils ont des moyens de réduire la consommation. Ils
peuvent arriver à économiser beaucoup d’énergie avec leur comportement. Ceci dit, c’est qu’eux ils ne sont pas dans
les années 80, ils peuvent profiter de l’expérience des autres. »
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profitable job markets all around. Finally, Turkey can empower the public through awareness
campaigns to aim to curb excessive use of domestic electricity.
With measures such as these, Turkey should commit to improve its energy efficiency by
ten to fifteen percent by 2020. Although consumption rises each year, this can be cancelled out
through efficiency measures, and a decrease can be achieved with implementation of ‘green’
standards across industries. The effect would be extremely profitable over time; energy would be
utilized more efficiently, allowing for job creation.
However, the EU is far from perfect. It too must continue ameliorating its systems
working against climate change.  Specifically, the EUETS, despite its general success, holds
several flaws. Firstly, targets diverge among member states. Certainly, the EU’s members are far
too diverse in economy and industry to work towards the same emissions reduction target,
however, greater surveillance must be exercised by the EU to ensure that member states set
adequately challenging targets and meet them. Currently, member states are the principal actors
in monitoring and reporting procedures. As such, some countries do not pull their weight and
undermine the initiative as a whole. Officially, the Commission is working to harmonize the
reporting procedures to make the system more cost-effective, transparent, and functional,
reasoning that “Since the objectives of complying with the EU's commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol, in particular the monitoring and reporting requirements laid down therein, cannot, by
their very nature, be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better
achieved at EU level, the EU may also adopt measures” (European Commission Climate Action
2010). However, this remains to be accomplished.
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In addition, the EU ETS does not incorporate one very problematic sector—
transportation. The transportation sector’s greenhouse gas emission share equaled 19.5 percent of
the total in 2007 for the EU 27. In fact, distances traveled for due to the transportation of goods
increased by 80 percent between 1990 and 2005; 40 percent of which came from trucks alone. In
turn this created a 36 percent increase in emissions between 1990 and 2007. For comparison,
emissions decreased 15 percent in other sectors during this same time period (European
Commission Climate Action 2010). In order to truly tackle emissions, the EU needs monitor the
transport sector with binding regulations. At present, the EU is officially initiating “a study to
investigate the sorts of policies and technologies that are needed to achieve substantial emission
reductions by 2050”. The EU must identify the most cost effective solutions for the internal
market and create incentives for fuel efficient cars and alternative fuel sources. Furthermore, it
should compose a complex system of monitoring the transportation of goods, attributing the
emissions to the transporting company responsible for them. In turn, transportation emissions
should be phased into the EUETS (European Commission Climate Action 2010).
With regard to energy efficiency measures, a similar problem is identified. If birds of a
feather fly together, the EU is host to many different birds. Although the Commission sets a
nationally tailored goals and reduction target for each member state, which retain the right to
meet these goals with the measures and pace they choose, countries fly in different directions.
The Directorate General for Internal Policies 2010 report identified a significant gap between
several member states with regard to the political commitment to energy efficiency, the measures
conceptualized and the resources allocated. Although several member states created Action Plans
to meet the 9% target, most of them maintained business-as-usual approach that made falling
short quite likely (Hinicio et al. 2010). The starkest divergences, as highlighted in Chapter 1, are
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linked to economic and political factors. For example, Bulgaria, a new member state with a low
GDP and less dynamic economy, struggles to incorporate renewable technology into its market
place. In contrast, Sweden, Denmark and other economically vibrant Scandinavian countries
introduce renewable technology incentives schemes and flourish.
The Commission itself has reported insufficient progress: “The European Union will not
be able to meet the commitments given at Kyoto unless significant measures are taken to reduce
demand. The measures will have to be in tune with the concern to reduce dependence on
imported energy supplies” (European Commission 2000, p 52). Similarly, the Commission
Green Paper notes that the only way of influencing supply is to make serious efforts with
renewable sources (European Commission Green Paper 2001, p 75). Once again, this priority
shift towards renewable resources will in turn make Turkey more attractive from an energy
standpoint, requiring the surmounting of political barriers for the sake of long term energy needs
and the environment.
Overall, greater policy cooperation among EU member states is necessary in the field of
energy. Diversifying the security of supply away from Russia will be more effective if individual
countries cease to strike bilateral deals. However, the EU would be wise to provide funding to
member states to interconnect their natural gas network to other pipelines, as geographically
some do not have much choice. This also pertains to renewable energy; the EU should take
responsibility to fund financial buffers to introduce renewable technology into less economically
vibrant economies. Only then will the gap between goal achieving shorten. With increased policy
cooperation with Turkey, the aforementioned countries could import Turkish renewable energy
via ENTSO-E. The benefits of harmonizing methods in policies are great; as emphasized by
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Charles Hantouche of RTE, a Turk three hours away with the same training can assist during a
blackout or shortage, and vice versa.
Integration through Multilateral Engagement and Bilateral Agreements
One way in which the EU could begin engaging Turkey more actively as an energy
partner is through multilateral organizations and bilateral projects. For example, the TEN-E
initiative serves as a useful mechanism to forge greater public (governmental) and private
alliances between Turkey and the EU. With greater interaction, each will become better equipped
and acquainted with one another to carry forth endeavors (political, energy related, business,
ect). For instance, EU reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession (2006 and 2007) shifted
more and more focus onto Turkey’s role in the TEN-E, insisting that Turkey pursue efforts to
support projects such as Nabucco (Tekin & Williams 2009, p 13). Later, in 2009, Turkey signed
the International Agreement on the Nabucco gas Pipeline, serving as a strategic step between
EU-Turkey energy cooperation (Commission Report 533 2009). The Commission had flagged
this project as a TEN-E priority; which are characterized as having a significant impact on the
proper functioning of the internal market, on the security of supply and/or the use of renewable
energy sources (Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation 2007). The EU reports that the Nabucco
Pipeline Project and interconnection with Turkey will “ensure the additional capacities necessary
to meet the inexorable increase in demand for electricity and gas, and will satisfy CO2 reduction
targets whilst integrating on a large scale new sources of renewable energy” (Europa: Summaries
of EU Legislation 2008).  Turkey’s legitimating and engagement of the EU’s top priorities shows
a marked shift towards increased cooperation, and indeed rapprochement. Since the TEN-E itself
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aims to exist as a conduit to development of renewable energy, Turkey’s cooperation with the
TEN-E sets the stage for further integration in the field of renewable energy initiatives.
Turkey also maintains observer status in the European Energy Community. The Energy
Community, formed in 2005, aims to coordinate the aquis communautaire with third party
countries, dealing specifically with natural gas, petrol and electricity networks. It aims to
establish “the creation of one great trans-national energy market”. In order to become a member,
a nation must implement the energy related aquis, liberalize their energy market and fashion
their regulatory structure to the EU’s standards.  These measures are legally binding. Again, the
EU aims to stabilize its surrounding region through regulatory convergence, or in other words,
adaptation of their set of rules. The energy community sites Turkey’s full accession as a short
term priority, meaning it should happen as soon as possible, and supports the opening of the
energy chapter in the accession negotiations to deepen cooperation and establish a more solid
framework for gas transport. Turkey, having made significant progress to liberalize its energy
market and implement a proper regulatory authority (EMRA) could potentially see membership
in their near horizon, should it so choose. Certainly, joining the Energy Community would
indicate a dedicated long term commitment to the EU, and greatly influence their relationship
(Energy Community 2011).
Meanwhile, Turkey’s foreign policy goals compliment the EU’s efforts to stabilize its
neighborhood. Turkey’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” foreign policy approach, pioneered by
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s foreign policy agenda since he became Foreign Minister in May 2009, has
“[…] charted a course of action based to the extent feasible on soft power diplomacy,
taking numerous initiatives to resolve its conflicts with neighbors but also to offer its
good offices to mediate and unfreeze conflicts between states to which it is not a party.
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Its credibility has become so great that Istanbul has replaced European capitals as the
preferred venue for conflict resolution whether in relation to Afghanistan or even Iran,
and despite its much publicized diplomatic differences with Washington” (Falk 2012).
Clearly, the objectives of both the EU and Turkey involve acting as mediators and leaders
within the region. Without the EU, Turkey’s financial backing for development and learning
curve remains longer. Without Turkey, the EU will not enjoy as much influence in the Caspian
region. Especially with regard to energy, Turkey’s shift towards a peace-keeping foreign policy
agenda makes the EU’s likelihood of enjoying a stable energy supply more likely.
Indeed, Turkey’s elites are interested in fostering a rapprochement through implementing
EU regulatory standards and the acquis as well. The Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural
Resources Strategic Plan 2010-14 , prioritizes several reform projects on Turkey’s energy sector
within the context of the joining the EU, and specifically, the scope of the 2009 and 2010 Pre-
Accession Financial Cooperation Programming. The European Commission and Turkey signed
off on a 2,005,500 euro project to improve the structure and capacity of TEİAŞ, Turkey’s
electricity transmission company. Turkey will co-finance ten percent of the project. The
Commission also agreed to the 1.5 million Euro “Project of Adaptation of Grid Regulation with
ENTSO-E Legislation” proposed by TEİAŞ, within the scope of the 2010 Pre-Accession Plan.
Turkey will also contribute ten percent of the cost. Such efforts to secure the European and
Turkish electricity systems prove a more long-term strategic approach to their energy partnership
(The Republic of Turkey 2009, p 30). Projects of this nature are exactly what will nurture a long-
term and reliable energy partnership between Turkey and the EU.
*
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The multilateral mechanisms through which Turkey and the EU could improve their
partnership already exist. The TEN-E is a well-funded and promising initiative. The key is to
ensure that the TEN-E funds a renewable project in Turkey. Simply acknowledging and
identifying attractive projects is not enough. Although the TEN-E have helped foster the
Nabucco project, similar efforts should be made with regard to renewable energy. Furthermore,
the Energy Community would prove monumental in that it would involve Turkey adopting the
energy acquis, certainly a loophole around the blocked Energy Chapter in accession negotiations.
These two organizations will help foster the partnership between the EU and Turkey.
Meanwhile, Turkey continues improving its relations with its other neighbors, an initiative that
promotes peace in the region as well as business exchanges.
Policy Recommendation
With the aforementioned in mind, it becomes clear that Turkey needs to join the Energy
Community. Since this would involve implementing the energy related acquis communautaire, it
is only logical that the Energy Chapter of accession negotiations be opened and completed as
well. Indeed, as the chapter would be virtually completed in practice, the EU, or in particular, the
individual member states like France who block it, will appear foolish in doing so.  Formally
opening this chapter is nonetheless absolutely vital for a well-functioning partnership to blossom
between the EU and Turkey. But in the meantime, Turkey signing the Energy Community Treaty
would be a strategic move to make progress in the energy sector in tandem with accession.
As it stands currently, to open the Energy Chapter alone would require conquering
various political obstacles outside the realm of energy. The chapter is currently blocked by
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France and Cyprus, who both vehemently oppose Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. According to
Charles Hantouche, “5.5 billion Euros are dedicated to funding assistance for EU candidate
countries […] Turkey receives 2.5 billion of this to help it align with European directives”
(Hantouche 2011).13 With so much money going towards bringing Turkey up to EU standards, it
is surprising to see certain member states attempt to drain the process of success. Financing a
country to reform its institutions, which is later blocked from validating reforms and
implementation of the acquis, is nonsensical. Why finance a country’s development to prepare it
for membership while simultaneously blocking accession negotiations? Of course, the reason for
this asinine behavior is the cacophony of views and interests that comprise the European Union
member states. Nonetheless, EU institutions need to make a greater effort to forge a harmonized
long-term outlook and vision for Europe’s needs. The EU unanimously voted Turkey as a
candidate country in 1999 and started negotiations in 2005. Since then, Turkey has done nothing
but progress and increase its cooperation. The EU must seriously consider the implications of
turning its back on a promise, in other words, engaging a country as a candidate and insisting on
implementing their governing regulations.
This argument applies entirely to energy policy. It would behoove member states to
forgoes singular disputes and preferences and instead adopt a strategic long term approach to
secure the future of energy. Energy is a domain that regards the collective area, not just
individual member states. As such, the approach should be harmonized. Finally, member states
must understand that in order to complete projects and achieve EU financed and supported
initiatives, particularly energy supply diversification, that a strategic partner such as Turkey must
13 Original quotation : « Il existe 5,5 milliards d’euros consacré aux aides au pays candidats. Turquie est
officiellement un candidat. La Croatie aussi. La Turquie a 2,5, pour que la Turquie s’aligne sur les directives
européennes »
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be welcomed into the energy community as an equal collaborator and ally to prevent failure and
severe backlash.
*
This chapter highlights many of the barriers preventing the EU and Turkey from pursuing
common energy goals on the path of least resistance. The dominating problem remains
intrinsically linked to overbearing national preferences, economic and political characteristics
and favored approaches. Within the EU itself, these divergences hinder progress towards EU
level goals as well as espousing a common approach towards something like energy supply. As
the EU possesses limited power, it should forge change through physically providing countries
with more options, such as interconnected natural gas pipelines. Certainly, this requires a budget
readjustment on behalf of the EU.
With reference to Turkey, the divergences among EU member states undermine dual
projects and ignore valuable potential in Turkey. For example, as a country in the Sun Belt with
solar energy potential, a TEN-E project makes perfect sense. After all, combating climate change
is for the betterment of the planet; funding such a project aligns with the EU’s espoused climate
change values. However, at present, such measures have not been taken.  A slippery slope
appears wherein sluggish policy from one actor (the EU) could provoke the same, sprinkled with
stubbornness from the other. This contributes to why Turkey has not yet signed the Energy
Community Treaty; after all, implementing the aquis is laborious and tedious, doing so while
certain member states despise you for it makes it a difficult sell from government to the masses.
Nonetheless, the needed changes must be developed at the governmental level. Business ventures
scattered among sectors certainly helps the market flourish and promotes cultural and political
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learning to a small degree, however, for wide-spread sustainable change to be in place, structural
long term means must be employed to reach the end. Only government has the ability to make
such large and consequential decisions. Ergo, the need for the EU to take its energy partnership
with Turkey more seriously has never been more salient an issue.
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CHAPTER 5 FIGURES
Figure 1:
(Nabucco Gas Pipeline 2012)
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CHAPTER 6
JUSTIFICATIONS
Improving Climate Change Mechanisms
While the EU acts admirably as a powerful global force to take the lead against climate
change, it risks losing credibility by setting over-ambitious targets. It remains to be seen whether
the EU will actually be able to meet its 202020 Commitments; if it doesn’t, technically nothing
will happen. However, the EU would lose face. While the EU has managed to implement the
EUETS, energy efficiency and renewable directives into Community law, the instruments within
the law allow member states to meet different targets with diverging methods, creating much
room for error. This in of itself does not guarantee progress; a classic “race to the bottom” risk
applies in this situation; enjoying the free movement of labor and pursuit of an occupation,
companies unwilling to invest in renewable or to reduce carbon emissions can do business in
countries with lower and less invasive climate change commitments.  This in turn would
postpone the progress of the EU’s initiatives and exacerbate the problem in countries with
already low targets.
This is in part why the Commission aims to reform its monitoring and compliance
mechanisms in the near future. Increased supranational control will forward the EU’s energy
policy initiatives. As such, taking such measures is crucial to the EU meeting its goals and
maintaining a positive and affluent reputation in the international community. The EU is not a
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military power; as previously explained, its power is normative and soft. They EU must continue
to exert this power to hold its place in the global arena. If the EU cannot achieve its own goals,
its normative power towards others becomes jeopardized. This would undermine future
European projects in the field of energy and beyond.
In turn, it remains necessary for the EU to allocate larger portions of its budget to
subsidizing renewable and efficient energy technology. After all, subsidizing preferred industries
is old hat—economies around the world spend billions to keep the fossil fuel industries in full
force---that’s $409 billion in subsidies for fossil-fuel, to be exact, spent worldwide in 2010
according to Maria van der Hoeven, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency. In
the same year less than a fifth was spent to support renewable energy, totaling $66 billion. She
says:
“Wind, solar, hydro and other forms of renewable energy account for almost a fifth of all
electricity produced worldwide, and my agency sees that share expanding to at least 32
percent by 2035. Much of that growth to date has been encouraged by government
incentives, and some of that must remain the case going forward” (van der Hoeven 2012).
If the EU is serious about combating climate change, subsidies are in order. Many nation
states already offer subsidies, and with great success. In fact, according to van der Hoeven, in
several markets “technology is rapidly approaching competitiveness with retail electricity
prices”. Countries which introduced renewable subsidies early on, such as Germany, the UK,
Italy, and Switzerland, are finding that their markets are mature enough to thrive without such
large subsidies (commonly exercised through feed in tariffs).
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The gap between the aforementioned countries and others which still struggle to fashion
the right structural changes and policy decisions to meet EU renewable energy goals is large. As
such, the EU should offer subsidies when the nation state is not able, to guide the market to a
healthy stage until it can prosper on its own.  This will greatly enable the EU to meet its 202020
goals by more efficiently employing more efficient mechanisms tailored to differing needs.
Liberalizing Markets through Policy Mechanisms
Although the EU has a single market for goods and services, this has not historically
applied to energy resources. As such, supply and demand for resources, such as natural gas, have
been confined to regions and sub-regions, dictated by few companies who inherently maintain
almost absolute control. This, of course, affects price and creates energy supply insecurity, both
at the EU level and national level. In recent years, pipelines were no longer allowed ownership
by suppliers, unless specifically exempt by the European Commission, allowing more suppliers
to utilize pipelines across Europe. However, nation states were still constricted in their choice of
supplier, based in geography, existing pipelines in place, and a segregated market.
As such, the EU should allocate part of its budget to build interconnectors for pipelines
throughout the EU, allowing countries more choice among suppliers. This could reduce
dependence on a single supplier, such as Russia, easing the EU’s natural gas supply insecurity..
Countries would have the ability to buy gas from a supplier at a lower price. This would help to
liberalize the natural gas market, making competition possible and helping stabilize prices.
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In fact, on March 23, 2012, the European Gas Regulatory Forum (or Madrid Forum)
endorsed the “Gas Target Model” of the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER). This
decision will integrate all national markets into a single liberalized market, creating large
wholesale markets across the EU, an initiative that has been contemplated for fifteen years The
liberalized market, comprised of smaller sub-markets will favor competitive spot gas trading in
zones, regardless of distance traveled, and will be interconnected and open to cross-border
trading.  This will be a large game-changer for the historical giants like Gazprom, who cut long
term contracts to send gas through pipelines they owned, leaving no rights to the buyer to sell to
anyone else (Beckman 2012).
Furthermore, a liberalized integrated market will allow gas to come from various
suppliers, favoring competition and thus preventing one player from having the power to
manipulate prices. As it stands currently, Russia has this power, as it is the main source of
European natural gas. But with a competitive market bringing in natural gas from various
suppliers, this power disintegrates.
Jean-Michel Glachant, Director of the Florence School of Regulation, is quoted in the
European Energy Review says: “You cannot leave the market to be developed by the market
players […] The incumbents don’t want to change the structure. They don’t want to open the
door to new players” (Beckman 2012). Companies which hold monopolies in certain countries
have no incentive to open the market up to competition; it would threaten their comfortable
patterns of controlling segregated and fragmented markets. As such, policy changes at the EU
level are appropriate. Already, with the endorsement of the liberalized natural gas market, the
EU is taking a large step in the right direction.
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Furthermore, integration will make the EU market more attractive. The EER also quotes
Walter Boltz, Head of the Austrian Energy Regulatory Authority (E-Control) and Vice-President
of CEER, “So suppliers will have a much larger market, which is connected and transparent, and
which everyone can access on an equal basis. That will make the market much more attractive
than it is now” (Beckman 2012).
With interconnected pipelines available for use by all suppliers and buyers and with an
integrated and liberalized natural gas market in place, competition will flourish, leveling the
playing field among suppliers, which will contribute to a more stable natural gas market.  Of
course, an instrumental component of the success of this EU-led market integration through
policy mechanisms and pipeline interconnectors is Nabucco. Nabucco is the key to diversifying
the gas flowing within the pipelines, ensuring that one supplier doesn’t dominate the scene.
Supply Diversification
Nabucco is the poster-child of EU and Turkish supply diversification. With years of
negotiations under the bridge, the time to move forward is now. While skeptics maintain that
Nabucco will fail logistically, due to politics and source supply issues, the reality of the situation
is that Nabucco is now too big to fail. A failed Nabucco will drastically tarnish Turkish-EU
relations, as well as the relations of each with supplier sources. Not to mention, it will exaggerate
Russia’s power as the main supplier country, opening the door for too much control over the
market and prices, and devolve the diversity of supply initiative. As explained subsequently,
Nabucco can and must succeed.
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At present, only certain member states support the initiative. Nabucco shareholders
include Bulgarian Energy Holding (Bulgaria), Botas (Turkey), FGSZ (Hungary), OMV
(Austria), RWE (Germany) and Transgaz (Romania). Each shareholder holds an equal share of
16.67% of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH and are responsible for negotiating gas
supply contracts. Logically, each country that will host the pipeline is a shareholder. Germany,
one of the most powerful members of the EU, is also on board.
RWE states classic reasons for supporting Nabucco, citing Russian winter supply cut-
offs, increasing EU (and German) natural gas import demand and decreasing internal production,
as well as the advantage of connecting to a region that contains the world’s largest combined
natural gas reserves (RWE 2012). According to Jeremy Ellis, Head of Business Development of
RWE Trading, RWE is “fully committed to see Nabucco through. It assists us in our
diversification perspectives, in developing upstream activities in certain regions, in our drive for
further development in Turkey and Southern Europe and elsewhere” (Beckman 2010). In the
same interview, Ellis affirms that EU political support had solidified, with support from the
Commission, Mr. Barroso and Energy Commissioner Oettinger. He also indicates the full
support of the United States and German governments, noting: “In the coalition agreement of the
new Merkel government that was signed in September, Nabucco is mentioned as a priority
policy objective to diversify energy supplies. Chancellor Merkel has met President Aliyev (of
Azerbaijan; EER)”. Last but not least, Turkey shows full commitment as well. With political,
commercial and technical disputes dissolved, the largest question marks remain on the supplier
countries.
Nonetheless, as member states retain significant sovereignty for energy-related
endeavors, they often maintain their historical ties with certain supplier countries. For example,
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Italy and France support the South Stream Pipeline, which imports Russian gas. Certainly, this
works against Nabucco and undermines the EU’s ability to sidestep Russian gas imports.
However, Ellis expressed a lack of concern for the South Stream, stating: “If you were a supplier
or shipper, and you had the choice, you would recognize that South Stream is three or four times
as expensive as Nabucco […] The choice seems pretty obvious to me” (European Energy
Review 2010).  Furthermore, France had asked to join the Nabucco consortium, but this was
contested by Turkey for politically sensitive reasons, such as France passing legislation in
December 2011 stating that in France, contesting the existence of an “Armenian Genocide”
during World War I in Turkey would be a criminal offense. French President Nicolas Sarkozy
has also blocked accession chapters for Turkey, and approved the measure of holding a national
referendum on Turkey’s accession once Turkey gains ground, knowing right well that overall
public opinion is unfavorable. Certainly, these political tensions evoke highly emotional
responses, and explain why France, an EU member equally as powerful as Germany, does not
officially support the initiative.  These discrepancies between member states, inherent within
current EU energy policy, undermine a collective and harmonized approach. Presenting a divided
front could prove harmful with regard to rallying for commitments from supplier countries for
Nabucco.
Meanwhile, Nabucco’s supply sources continue to materialize, circumventing the largest
criticism against Nabucco. Through recent EU-Turkey led negotiations and energy/foreign
policy initiatives, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are on board. Hafiz Pashayev, Deputy Foreign
Minister, Republic of Azerbaijan explains that this demonstrates great progress towards a
collective vision of energy policy among regional players, namely Turkey:
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“Recent agreements between Turkey and Azerbaijan give us hopes that two countries
have made a significant and well-crafted move towards strategic vision on regional gas
projects. This act has reminded me same ’90s when regional leaders were making some
tactical sacrifices to put aside their differences for the sake of strategic vision and
partnership” (Pashayev 2011).
Once again, this demonstrates how governmental agreements are necessary to further
energy policy priority projects; when dealing with politically sensitive geographic areas, each
step must be strategic and careful. Businesses are less likely to invest, or invest successfully in
regions where their governments do not enjoy solid mutual relationships.
Iraq also expresses interest and ability to provide supply. Hussain al-Shahristani, Deputy
Prime Minister for Energy, Republic of Iraq, confirmed the cooperation between the EU and Iraq
pursuant to a strategic energy partnership memorandum of cooperation signed in January 2010.
The memorandum pertains to supplying Europe with Iraqi gas. He said: “Iraq confirmed that
sales gas would be available from Iraq to Europe after 2017 […] [Iraq] would like to assure
Europeans that they can count on Iraq as a dependable, long-term supplier of their energy needs,
including gas” (al-Shahristani 2011). Suddenly, through political means, Nabucco’s greatest
liabilities seem to lessen significantly.
Nonetheless, the quantity of Iraq’s reserves remains undocumented with certainty, as can
be identified from Ashti Hawrami’s comment, the Minister of Natural Resources of the
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq: “In Kurdistan Region of Iraq, I think we have potential
for about 100 to 200 TCF of gas”. These estimates should be confirmed before moves are made.
Although the promise of its business depends largely on political factors in a historically unstable
country, at present Iraq seems committed to business with Turkey and Europe. He continued:
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“[…] Naturally, Turkey is a large market. The Turkish market is by far the biggest in the whole
of Europe. So we will be looking at Turkish market and beyond through, perhaps, whatever
transit route might be available to Europe” (Hawrami 2011). Clearly, Iraq has become a viable
alternative for Nabucco gas supply, making the initiative feasible and largely worthwhile. As
such, reservations and criticism of Nabucco revolving around its “lack of suppliers” are losing
their footing and quickly disintegrating. Furthermore, according to the 2010 Mott MacDonald
Report, the EU’s does not have any other pragmatic supply diversification options! Countries
such as Algeria, Libya and Egypt simply do not possess enough reserves (MacDonald 2010, p 9).
According to the MacDonald analysis, any possibility of creating a “Mediterranean Gas
Ring” in its extending from Algeria through Libya and Egypt to Turkey is not economically
feasible (MacDonald 2010, p 11). The report also offered a reputable prognosis regarding
pipeline construction through Turkey and the utilization of Iraqi Gas: “Iraqi Gas via Turkey
results in the lowest transportation costs of all scenarios considered […]” (MacDonald 2010, p
13).
In summary, the holes in the Nabucco project have been patched in recent years. The
project is the most viable and profitable conception on the table. Member states who oppose
would do better to offer alternative solutions rather than to criticize for politically charged
reasons. Meanwhile, Nabucco and its supporters have performed an admirable job tying loose
ends and preparing to launch construction.
External Governance
Many of the EU’s regional agreements aim to mitigate the uncertainties circulating within
its “neighborhood”. For example, the Black Sea Synergy aims to reduce conflict through
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communication and collaboration. However, critics will rightfully highlight that forcing
cooperation among countries that do not possess very much in common is artificial in nature and
not pragmatic in practice.  Many Black Sea Synergy countries are involved in long standing
frozen conflicts. Meanwhile, though the Euro-med provides monetary incentives to civil
societies and promotes knowledge transfer between the EU and these countries, it only interacts
with secular organizations. As such its overarching goal to integrate itself within and among the
region has been sourly received at times; as many of these countries are not secular in nature.
Therefore, treating them as secular countries, or only cooperating with the secular components
within these countries, can produce unproductive results. The EU needs to reform its strategy
with regard to its multilateral regional frameworks. The soft and normative components of them,
while very important, have not been incredibly helpful in fostering change within the European
Neighborhood. Without a well-organized approach that is tailored to the cultural, political, and
economic nuances of each country, the EU’s cooperative and democratic norm exportation in the
region will continue to falter. This will not favor economic exchange, energy agreements, or
stability. Although the EU doesn’t go as far to attempt a “one size fits all” approach, all countries
within one region should not be approached uniformly.
With a slightly altered approach, the EU could stimulate progress. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,
President, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, underlined this idea when she said:
“Southeast Europe and Black Sea is an extremely diverse region, yet there is one thing that all
countries of this region have in common. This is the European perspective. […] The role of the
pan-European institutions is to support the European aspirations of the countries of the region by
promoting political stability, fostering economic growth, and supporting social cohesion”
(Çavuşoğlu 2011). Indeed, these are the duties of these institutions, standing by them remains the
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backbone of European legitimacy and future external relations, as well as the foundation of
future energy related trade.
As such, it is still more beneficial for the EU to remain proactive towards Eastern Europe,
the Caspian and Central Asia as opposed to ambivalent. At least in the former scenario the EU
can attempt to make progress over time and learn about the specificities of each country and
region. This in turn will equip the EU to make wiser decisions and formulate more cohesive
normative foreign policy initiatives in the future. This will eventually enable the EU to benefit
from energy related trade, especially in the case of Turkey.
Towards Harmonized Energy Policy and Full Energy Partnership with Turkey
Many scholars such as Baç, Manners and Diez maintain the importance of the EU
upholding its normative power. The EU does not aspire to possess a large military capacity or
presence in the global arena, therefore it relies on its civilian tools and diplomatic negotiations to
promote its agenda in world politics and export its norms (Manners 2002). The EU’s main power
lays in its projection of its values, its main asset its ability to bring about political change in the
countries in its neighborhood (Diez 2004). Indeed, if the EU lets its relationship with Turkey, a
candidate country, fall through the cracks, the EU will lose massive credibility (Müfltuler-Baç
2008, p 65). If the Nabucco project were to fail, relations, both political and private, would be
shattered. The EU extends solidarity and financial support in granting a country candidate status,
with the expectation that the candidate country will develop and become stronger as it
assimilates the EU’s regulatory framework. If the case of Turkey ends by a failed candidacy due
to diverging political support, EU candidacy itself will lose credibility, for it would no longer
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remain true that a country would be welcomed into the European community if it implemented
the aquis and fit the EU’s criteria. Serap Atan, representative of TUSIAD in Paris, France,
indicated during an interview with the author that Cyprus blocks Turkey’s progress towards EU
accession, especially regarding energy. She notes:
“There is much interest between the EU and Turkey, the market is harmonized, but
there’s no real network because of political tensions. We must accelerate this process.
But also in 2014 the EU will announce its new budget, so we must accelerate reforms in
Turkey. It’s TUSIAD’s role to put pressure, to lobby, to advance negotiations, and to
advance and improve economic and political standards in Turkey to become a member”
(Atan 2011).
TUSIAD, which represents half of Turkey’s added value among its members, plays a key
role in facilitating reform from a governmental and private perspective. However, as Ms. Atan
states, the burden must be shared equally. Issues revolving around Cyprus and Turkey must be
settled in order for progress to move forward.
This would detract from the EU’s ability to maintain normative power in the global
arena, and especially within its periphery. At this point, the shared history between the EU and
Turkey with regard to accession negotiations has gone on too long for a peaceful ending, unless
it involves Turkey joining the EU. But even so, countries like France and Cyprus show no signs
of softening their vehemence towards Turkey. So what will become of the candidacy? With
almost no progress on accession negotiations, supporters have turned skeptic in Turkey and
beyond. The situation becomes more emotional, if it wasn’t enough already, as Turks begin to
feel unwanted, and accordingly, decide they don’t want to take part either. In effect this creates a
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messy divorce of sorts, wherein large long term investments are already shared (such as
Nabucco). Political and economic tensions would rise, and relations with Turkey and the EU
would catapult. Worse yet, refusing Turkey’s entry into the EU not only crushes the credibility
and conditionality attached to candidacy status, but also reinforces the idea in the non-Christian
European neighborhood that a Muslim country has no place in the EU. Reinforcing this belief
would become catastrophic for the EU’s relations with the Middle East, the Caspian, the
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and likely others. With regard to energy, specifically diversifying
supply, this could back-fire the EU’s strategy as well. Turkmenistan, Iraq and Azerbaijan might
become bitter about agreeing to supply gas. This could result in a rupture of contract or a more
indirect way of complicating the issue; for example, allowing Russia to buy a majority of share
in one of the countries would put the power back into Russia’s hand again. Or, the countries
themselves could cut off supply or raise prices.
In review, the EU and Turkey are far too invested and interconnected with one another to
let accession negotiations fail. The negative political, economic and energy related fallout would
be devastating. The only way to go is forward; the EU should prioritize doing so.
Opening the Energy Chapter and Investing in Development
One way in which the EU could move forward is by opening the Energy Chapter of
accession negotiations. Critics emphasize that Turkish and European leaders have grown upset
about stalemate accession negotiations, and that any vision of engagement, alignment or
integration have remained nothing but empty words. Further still, one might maintain that
without opening the energy chapter cooperation is all for naught. But advancement is on the
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horizon.  In February 2012, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood
Policy ŠtefanFüle and Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger met with the Turkish
Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış and Energy Minister Taner Yildiz
agreed to support opening the Energy Chapter in accession negotiations:
“In a constructive and positive meeting, both sides underlined the importance of opening
the energy chapter, while agreeing that closer cooperation in areas such as market
integration (both electricity and gas) including development of infrastructure and secure
transport of gas, the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency, is mutually
beneficial. Additionally, EU-Turkey energy relations can benefit from a regular dialogue
on neighboring energy markets” (Europa Press Release 2012).
As such, they vowed to implement a joint working group by May 2012, charged with
identifying which policy actions must be taken for full integration and cooperation. The press
release is careful to specify that these actions are intended to progress accession negotiations and
not replace them. In short, this meeting solidified an understanding to bring Turkey closer to
joining the EU through cooperation and implementation of the acquis.
Meanwhile, investing to develop Turkey will bear fruit for Europe. For example, by
connecting Turkey to the ENTSO-E, electricity importation and exportation potential is enabled
for both parties; the international transmission connections are made with the neighboring
countries and the existing connections are strengthened. To emphasize the observation of French
citizen Charles Hantouche, some of the benefits include the ability to call upon technicians
trained to tend to the same technology and electrical machinery. He explains that this is only
beneficial to perform with countries in the same region, which he affirms includes Turkey. This
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enables a high security for electricity supply and lessens the possibility of shortages. It also helps
stabilize prices as countries have more options, keeping competition high.
In certain regards, Turkey knows several advantages. First off, Turkey’s learning curve is
high. Much of the infrastructure that the EU, for instance, needs to change and replace, can
simply be built and developed in Turkey, without needing to tear down the old. For example,
Turkey is just now building its first nuclear plants. Secondly, great gains in energy efficiency can
be made since their consumption until the present has not been very conscious. Comparatively,
making drastic reductions in Turkey is more easily executable than in other nations that have
already taken significant strides in this realm. Finally, with the EU getting personally involved in
Turkey’s energy sector and its development, Turkey will not only benefit from financial
assistance, but also knowledge sharing from EU industry leaders. As such it is of utmost
importance to integrate Turkey properly into the European energy network and market, as well
as align their policies.
*
With detailed investigation, the stakes behind Nabucco and opening the Energy Chapter
become blatantly clear. Likewise is the importance of exercising a structurally sound and
powerful external governance strategy that favors customization within and among regions.
Especially within the argument of the need to progress accession negotiations, investment in
Turkey seems only logical. Not only will financial investment allow Turkey to improve its
infrastructure and implement the same energy standards as Europe, but investing time in
knowledge-sharing projects will prove especially useful in the long-term. As such, Turkey’s
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transition into the EU will become less and less dramatic—at least, at an institutional and energy
infrastructural level.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The Republic of Turkey has historically borrowed European models; the French
administrative system, the German work codes, and Italian codes of commerce. Today, this
tradition remains no different as Turkey continues to improve democratic standards and adopt
EU legislative and regulatory frameworks.
This process has far-stretching economic consequences. The EU-Turkey customs union
stretches as far as the Caspian, the Balkans, Russia, and the Middle East; for Turkey must
maintain EU codes for trade with regard to competition, copyrights, intellectual property rights,
and so forth.  Not only does this help develop the Turkish interior market enormously, but also
helps develop Turkey’s third-party trading partners as well.
However, economic integration can only accomplish so much. With the future of energy
security at the forefront in national and international agendas, countries need to work more
closely together to combat threats with and without borders. For the EU and Turkey, this
requires separate efforts from both sides, as well as cooperative effort together. The EU must
first fill in the gaps within its own energy policy at home. The supranational jurisdiction of the
EU should be increased for the sake of the long-term energy needs of Europe, to detract from
reliance on one sole supplier, Russia, and diversify the EU’s friends and partners with regard to
energy importation. The EU should adjust its budget to factor in expenditure in the form of
incentives and subsidies to assist member states which struggle to meet 202020 objectives, as
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well as initiate pipeline interconnection projects to enable each member state to diversify its
suppliers regardless of geography and historical supplier preferences.
Hence, the EU must use the precedent it has to work to foster agreements between all
members to carefully introduce measures that would enable the EU to act as a single player in
the energy market. More equality within the EU itself could cultivate more unified views and
approaches to relations with Turkey---allowing for an energy partnership to be fully beneficial
for both. With more harmonious political support from within the EU, Turkey can begin
implementing the EU energy acquis, open the energy chapter, and develop into a powerful
economic and regional power. Even if political tensions cannot be remediated at present,
adoption of the energy acquis would prove beneficial for both partners, and would very much
expedite the opening and closing of the energy chapter upon its occurrence.
Turkey, on the other hand, must continue to demonstrate its willingness to Europeanize
its energy sector. Truly, Turkey has made tremendous progress in recent years through
liberalization, and has proved paramount to facilitating the success of Nabucco through its
strategic political negotiations with its neighbors—something the EU alone is not capable of.
Nonetheless, Turkey must continue to overcome domestic barriers and dwindling public opinion
with regard to the EU to implement the energy acquis. Doing so would inherently improve its
energy efficiency and carbon emission standards. Furthermore, it would grant access into the
European Energy Community. From here, a slippery slope ensues, wherein once Turkey’s
energy sector is harmonized with the regulatory norms of the EU, investment and business
transactions, as well as political endeavors, will basically create themselves. In essence, if
Turkey situates itself to become a member of the Single Market beyond the current customs
union, extending it to energy, the positive repercussions will be tenfold.
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With the EU supporting a Europeanized Turkish energy sector, renewable energy is far
more likely to be developed. Furthermore, such development will benefit both the EU and
Turkey, as both can utilize the renewable power generation through import and export
transactions within the ENTSO-E. The EU and Turkey have the opportunity to make waves in
the renewable energy sector, and should begin doing so now, in spite of frozen accession
negotiations, through the TEN-E initiative. Together, they would not only show the world that
the clash of civilizations is surmountable, and that collaboration and partnership can prevail over
xenophobic fears, but also that renewable energy is the way of the future. With a successful
partnership between the EU and Turkey, allowing both to utilize the renewable energy sources in
Turkey, the world will see how such ventures can be profitable and positively effect the
environment. As such, Turkey’s power as a regional actor would increase and the EU’s
normative power solidified.
Finally, a full energy partnership between the EU and Turkey will not only facilitate the
success of the Nabucco project, but also its functioning over the next fifty years. As a candidate
country, it is no surprise that the EU chose Turkey to host the high cost pipelines to secure
Europe’s energy supply. In order to conduct maintenance and allow for business investment to
flourish, all countries involved must be willing to cooperate and collaborate. If relations were to
stay as they are currently between the EU and Turkey, the project would remain feasible, but less
successful. It is clear through recent negotiations with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iraq that
Turkey’s role in solidifying partnership among its neighbors and the EU is significant. The same
can be said for business investment. However, as was exemplified at the Black Sea Economic
Forum, Turkey’s contribution should not be taken for granted. With large stakes in the project,
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political harmony should be ensured. Only then can the large scale projects inherent in Nabucco
maximize profit and efficiency.
Certainly, with such developments, and a comprehensive energy partnership between the
EU and Turkey, less convinced member states among the EU may “see it and believe it”. In
other words, a full energy partnership could exist as the key to reinvigorating Turkey’s accession
negotiations. Already, agreement from both sides is in place to open the energy chapter. With the
energy acquis in place, Nabucco a successful flagship project, and renewable energy  goals a
reality with the added contribution of Turkey, the skeptical member states may begin to evaluate
the utility of Turkey’s membership in a more objective light, leaving the political and the
emotional at home.
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